A TREATISE OF Taxes & Contributions.

WITHDRAWN
H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE

Shewing the Nature and Measures of

Crown-Lands, Assessments, Customs, Poll-Moneys, Lotteries, Benevolence, Penalties, Monopolies, Offices, Tythes, Raising of Coins, Harth-Money, Excize, &c.

With several interspersed Discourses and Digressions concerning

Warrs, The Church, Universities, Rents and Purchases, Usury and Exchange, Banks and Lombards, Registries for Conveyances, Beggars, Ensurance, Exportation of {Money, Wool}, Free-Ports, Coins, Housing, Liberty of Conscience, &c.

The same being frequently applied to the present State and Affairs of IRELAND.

By Sr. Wm. Petty.

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Tr. R.
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The PREFACE.

YOung and vain perſons, though perhaps they marry not primarily and onely on purpoſe to get Children, much leſs to get ſuch as may be fit for ſome one particular vocation; yet having Children, they diſpoſe of them as well as they can according to their reſpective inclinations: Even ſo, although I wrote theſe ſheets but to rid my head of ſo many troubleſome conceits, and not to apply them to the uſe of any one particular People or Concernment; yet now they are born, and that their Birth happened to be about the time of the *Duke of Ormond's* going Lord Lieutenant into *Ireland*, I thought they might be as proper for the conſideration of that place, as of any other, though perhaps of effect little enough in any.

Ireland is a place which muſt have ſo great an Army kept up in it, as may make the Iriſh deſiſt from doing themſelves or the Engliſh harm by their future Rebellions. And this great Army

must occasion great and heavy Leavies upon a poor people and wasted Countrey; it is therefore not amiss that *Ireland* should understand the nature and measure of Taxes and Contributions.

2. The Parishes of *Ireland* do much want Regulation, by uniting and dividing them; so as to make them fit Enclosures wherein to plant the Gospel: wherefore what I have said as to the danger of supernumerary Ministers, may also be seasonable there, when the new Geography we expect of that Island shall have afforded means for the Regulation abovementioned.

3. The great plenty of *Ireland* will but undo it, unless a way be found for advantageous Exportations, the which will depend upon the due measure of Custom and Excize here treated on.

4. Since *Ireland* is under-peopled in the whole, and since the Government there can never be safe without chargeable Armies, until the major part of the Inhabitants be English, whether by carrying over these, or withdrawing the other; I think there can be no better encouragement to draw English thither, then to let them know, that the Kings Revenue being above $\frac{1}{10}$ part of the whole Wealth, Rent, and proceed of the Nation; that the Publick Charge

in

in the next Age will be no more felt there then that of Tythes is here; and that as the Kings Revenue encreaſe, ſo the cauſes of his Expence will decreaſe proportionably, which is a double advantage.

6. The employing the Beggars in *England* about mending the High-wayes, and making Rivers Navigable will make the Wool and Cattle of *Ireland* vend the better.

7. The full underſtanding of the nature of Money, the effects of the various *ſpecies* of Coins, and of their uncertain values, as alſo of raiſing or embaſing them is a learning moſt proper for *Ireland*, which hath been lately much and often abuſed for the want of it.

8. Since Lands are worth but ſix or ſeven years purchaſe, and yet twenty years juſt croſs the Channel, 'twere good the people of *Ireland* knew the reaſons of it at a time when there is means of help.

Laſtly, if any man hath any Notions which probably may be good for *Ireland*, he may with moſt advantage expoſe them to publick examination now, when the Duke of *Ormond* is Chief Governour: for;

1. His Grace knows that Countrey perfectly well

well as well in times and matters of peace as War, and underſtands the Intereſts as well of particular perſons, as of all and every factions and parties ſtruggling with each other in that Kingdom; underſtanding withall the ſtate of *England*, and alſo of ſeveral Forreign Nations, with reference to *Ireland*.

2. His Grace hath given freſh demonſtration of his care of an Engliſh Intereſt in *Ireland*, and of his wiſdom in reconciling the ſeveral croſs concernments there ſo far as the ſame is poſſible.

3. His Graces Eſtate in Lands there is the greateſt that ever was in *Ireland*, and conſequently he is out of the danger incident to thoſe *Proreges* againſt whom *Cambden* ſayes, *Hibernia eſt ſemper querula*; there being no reaſon for ones getting more Land, who hath already the moſt of any.

4. Whereas ſome chief Governours who have gone into *Ireland*, chiefly to repair or raiſe fortunes, have withdrawn themſelves again when their work hath been done, not abiding the clamors and complaints of the people afterwards: But his Grace hath given Hoſtages to that Nation for his good Government,

ment, and yet hath taken away aforehand all fears of the contrary.

5. His Grace dares do whatever he understands to be fitting, even to the doing of a single subject Justice against a Confederate multitude; being above the sinister interpretations of the jealous and querulous; for his known Liberality and Magnificence shall ever keep him free from the clamor of the people, & his through-tried fidelity shall frustrate the force of any subdolous whisperings in the Ears of His Majesty.

6. His good acceptance of all ingenious endeavours, shall make the wise men of this Eastern *England* be led by his Star into *Ireland*, and there present him with their choicest advices, who can most judiciously select & apply them.

Lastly, this great person takes the great Settlement in hand, when *Ireland* is as a white paper, when there sits a Parliament most affectionate to his person, and capable of his Counsel, under a King curious as well as careful of Reformation; and when there is opportunity, to pass into positive Laws whatsoever is right reason and the Law of Nature.

Wherefore by applying those Notions un-

to

to *Ireland*, I think I have harped upon the right ſtring, and have ſtruck whileſt the Iron is hot; by publiſhing them now, when, if ever at all, they be uſeful. I would now advertiſe the world, that I do not think I can mend it, and that I hold it beſt for every mans particular quiet, to let it *Vadere ſicut vult*; I know well, that *res nolunt male adminiſtrari*, and that (ſay I what I will or can) things will have their courſe, nor will nature be cozened: wherefore what I have writ, (as I ſaid before) was done but to eaſe and deliver my ſelf, my head having bin impregnated with theſe things by the daily talk I hear about advancing and regulating Trade, and by the murmurs about Taxes, &c. Now whether what I have ſaid be contemned or cavilled at, I care not, being of the ſame mind about this, as ſome thriving men are concerning the profuſeneſs of their Children; for as they take pleaſure to get even what they believe will be afterwards piſſed againſt the wall, ſo do I to write, what I ſuſpect will ſignifie nothing: Wherefore the race being not to the ſwift, &c. but time & chance happening to all men, I leave the Judgment of the whole to the Candid, of whoſe correction I ſhall never be impatient.

The

The Index.

AN Enumeration and deſcription of the ſeveral Branches of the Publick Charge. Page 1.

The maintenance of Governours ought to be in greater ſplendour then private Callings can reach to, Ibidem

The honour of being truſted, and the pleaſure of being feared, is reward enough for ſome Offices. p. 2.

The Paſtorage of Souls ought to be a Publick Charge even upon a Civil Account. Ibid.

The uſe of Schools and Univerſities as they are a publick charge. 3.

The common and general Cauſes, which encreaſe and aggravate the burthen of paying Taxes. Ibid.

The Cauſes that excite Forreign and Offenſive Wars. 4

The Cauſes of Defenſive and Civil Wars. 5

A Cauſe of unneceſſary Eccleſiaſtical Charge, is the not fixing of Pariſhes according to the Alterations which have been in Religion and Trade. 6

That five thouſand Pariſhes are enough for England and Wales, ſo as to give unto each but a thouſand Pariſhioners, and ſo as that none need go two miles to Church. Ibid.

Antiquated Offices, and overgrown Fees a Cauſe of unneceſſary Charge in the Government, and adminiſtration of Juſtice. 8

Regiſters for Conveyances of Lands, and Depoſitories for moveable Pawns, as alſo Banks of Money will leſſen the Charge of Law-ſuits and Writings. 9

How the number of ſuch as relate to the Faculty of Medicine may be adjuſted. Ibid.

How the number of Students in the Univerſities intending to make Learning the way of their livelihood may be adjuſted. 10

An Use propounded for the choice Parish-Children and Foundlings, to force on an useful Work, which hath hitherto been but perfunctorily pursued. Ibid.

That the number of unnecessary Merchants and Retailers be retrenched. Ibid.

The careful Maintenance and Education of exposed Children, and concealing their names and Families, is a matter of great consequence. 11.

A proposal of several Employments, for Beggars and such as have now no Work. Ibid.

Great Works of Labour though in themselves unnecessary, are nevertheless of advantage to the Publick. 12

The mending of Highwayes, building Bridges and Causeys, and the making of Rivers Navigable in England, *would make English Horses an exportable Commodity, and help to vend the Commodities of* Ireland. 13

The Causes of unquiet bearing of Taxes, viz. Ibid.

First that the Sovereign exacts too much. 14

Secondly, That Assessments are unequally laid. Ibid.

Thirdly, That the Moneys levied are vainly expended. Ibid.

Fourthly, Or given to Favorites. 15

Fifthly, Ignorance of the Number, Trade, and Wealth of the people. Ibid

Sixthly, Obscurity about the right of imposing. 16

Seventhly, Fewness of people Ibid.

Eightly, Scarcity of Money, and confusion of Coins. Ibid.

Ninthly, That scarce an hundredth part of the Riches of this Nation is Coined Bullion Ibid,

Tenthly, the non-acceptance of Some Commodities in specie *in discharge of Taxes.* ibid.

The Consequences of a Taxes too heavy if there be too much Money in a Nation, which may be; or if there be too little, and that either in a State well or ill governed. 17,18,19.

The first way of providing for the Publick Charge, is the excinding or setting apart of a proportion of the Territory, in the nature of Crown-Lands. 19

The second is taking away the same proportion of the Rents of all Lands.

Lands. 20
The Nation is happy where either of the ſaid two wayes is practiſed ab antiquo, *and upon original agreement, and not exacted as a ſudden contingent Surcharge upon the people.* Ibid.
The Owners of ſettled Rents bear the burthen of a Land-Tax, or Aſſeſsment, others probably gaining thereby. Ibid.
A Land-Tax upon free Eſtates reſolves into an Excize upon Conſumptions. 21
Aſſeſsment, upon Houſing more uncertain then that of Land, Houſing being of a double nature, viz. *either an inſtrument of gain, or way of expence.* Ibid.
The heavy Taxing of Houſing no diſcouragement to new Buildings; nor is the diſcouragement of new buildings any means to prevent the popülouſneſs of a City 22
Prohibition to build upon new Foundations ſerves onely to fix the Ground-plot of a City. Ibid.
The reaſon why the City of London *removes its Ground plot Weſtward.* Ibid.
That 'tis probable the King of Englands *Palace will in proceſs of time be towards* Chelſey. 23
That the preſent Seat of London *will the greateſt Conhabitation of people ever whilſt this Iſland is inhabited.* Ibid.
The nature and natural Meaſures of the Rent of Land, Computed in Commodities of the growth of the ſaid Land Ibid.
The par between food or other proceed of Land, and Bullion or Coin. 24
The Par between Gold and Silver. Ibid.
Gold and Silver are not natural Standards of the Values of the τὰ χρήσα. 25
The prime Cenomination of the τὰ χρήσα are but two, viz. *Land and Labour, as the Denominations of Money in* England *are Pounds, Shillings, Pence.* Ibid.
Of the Par between Land and Labour. Ibid.
The reaſon of the number of years Purchaſe that Land is worth in ſeveral Countreys. 26
Why Land in Ireland *is worth fewer years Purchaſe then in* England. Ibid. 27.

The Description and Ratio formalis of Usury. 28
The same of Exchange. ibid.
The Measures of both. Ibid.
Why Usury hath been limited more then Exchange. 29
A parallel between the Changes of the price of Money, and that of Land, Ibid.
How to compute and compare the Rents of Lands, in order to a just Land-Tax or Assessment. 30
The intrinsick value of Land is found by Surveys of the Quantity, Figure and Scituation. Ibid.
And by the Survey of the Quality, viz. its aptitude to bear; first, precious Commodities; secondly, the best of the kind; thirdly, most in quantity. Ibid.
The extrinsick or accidental value depends upon the plenty of Money, luxurious or frugal living; the Opinions Civil, Natural, and Religious of the People.
It is necessary to these Enquiries to know how to tell the Gold and Silver Coins of this present Age, and compare the same with that of former times. Ibid.
How to compare not onely the Money of this present Age with that of the former, but the entire Riches of the present with the former People. Ibid.
By the numbers of People, and the proportion of Money amongst them, the accidental values of Lands are to be computed. 32
How to proportion the Rates of a Commodity in one place, unto the Rates of the same in another place. Ibid.
That the Day-wages of Labourers and several other of the most vulgar Tradesmen ought to be ascertain'd, and well adapted to the changes of time. Ibid.
That though the difficulty of computing the contingent values of Land be great, yet there be greater reasons for undergoing it. 33
The nature of Credit, as the said word is commonly used among Tradesmen, and otherwise. Ibid.
That the Sovereigns exact knowledge of the Subjects Estates would do them no harm. Ibid.
A description of the Duty of Customs. 34

A Conjecture that Customs at first were a kind of præmium *for ensurance against Pyrates.* Ibid.
The measure of the said Duty upon exported Goods. 35
The inconvenience of too heavy Customs. Ibid.
What Commodities may be forced to pay Customs. Ibid.
The measures of Customs upon imported Goods. Ibid.
The inconveniences of raising money by the way of Customs. 36
A Proposal, that instead of Tunnage and Poundage upon shipped Goods, a Tunnage were paid out of the Ships Fraight. 37
*Or that the Customs were taken as an Ensurance-*præmium: Ibid.
Of prohibited Commodities in general. Ibid.
Of prohibiting the exportation of Money and Bullion. Ibid.
The said prohibition of Money serves as a Sumptuary Law. 38
About the exportation of Wooll. Ibid.
The lessening of our Sheep-trade, and encrease of Corn-tillage is an expedient in this case for many reasons. 39
Other considerations tending to shew, that the too vehement prohibitions of Wooll may be ineffectual, or to do more harm then good. Ibid.
Of prohibiting Importations. 40
It were better to make and raise Commodities, though to burn them, then not to make them, or let the makers lose their Faculty, and be idle. Ibid.
Of Free Ports, and in what cases they may do good or harm. Ibid.
Of Poll-money, and the sorts of it. 41
The faults of the late Poll-moneys. Ibid.
Of the most simple Poll-money, where all pay alike, its conveniences and inconveniences. 42
Of Poll-money upon Titles, Offices, and Faculties. Ibid.
Hearth-money is of the same nature with simple Poll-money, but both are rather Accumulative Excizes. 43
Grants for publick Lotteries are Taxes upon the people. Ibid.
Why Lotteries ought not to be allowed but by good authority. 44
Raising of Money by Benevolence is a real Tax. Ibid.
Three cases where the way of Benevolence may be made good. Ibid.
Several reasons against it 45
The several species of Penalties. Ibid.

A doubt

A doubt whether the Penalties set down in Moses *Law ought to be inflicted now.* 46
The proper use and reason of every sort of Penalty. Ibid.
Perpetual Imprisonment is a kind of slow death. 47
In what case death, mutilation, imprisonment, disgrace, &c. ought to be commuted for pecuniary mulcts. Ibid.
The meaning of the double and multiple Restitutions mentioned in the Law of Moses. 48
Of the ways for punishing or permitting Heterodox Believers in Religion. 49
That the Soveraign may do either. Ibid.
That all Pseudodoxies whatsoever may be safely muzzled from doing harm by pecuniary mulcts. Ibid. 50
That the Soveriegn by punishing them with death, mutilations, or imprisonments, doth therein punish himself, and that too re infecta, very often. Ibid.
That the Pastours ought in some measure to be punished for the errors and defections of their Flocks. Ibid.
The true use of the Clergy is rather to be patterns of Holiness, then to teach men variety of Opinions de rebus divinis. 51
The substance of all that hath been said in this whole discourse about the Church. Ibid.
The abuse of Penal Laws. 52
Of Monopolies. Ibid.
The use and reason of instituting Monopolies. 53
A Digression about new Inventions, and the vexations incident to the Projectors of new practices. Ibid.
Offices instituted by the State, with Fees of their own appointment, are of a parallel nature to Monopolies. 54
Why the Fees of Offices were great heretofore. Ibid.
How Offices are become as a saleable Commodity. 55
Why many superfluous Offices are not abolished. Ibid.
A description of Tythes in several particulars. Ibid.
The causes why Tythes encrease. 56
The Rent of the Lands of England *is but a quarter of the Expence of the people.* Ibid.
The Tythes in England *are six times as much as they were four hundred*

hundred years ago. 57
The Clergie are far richer now than they were in ancient times, and yet have less work to do. Ibid.
The danger of too many Church-men. Ibid.
How to adjust the Number of Church-men and Students in Divinity. 58
Tythes is now no Tax or burthen upon the people. Ibid.
The way of Tythes is a good pattern for a Tax. Ibid.
The way of paying Tythes in the City and Countrey is very disproportionable. 59
The inconveniences of contributing to the Publick Charge after the manner of Tythes. Ibid.
A reason why the ways of Taxing the people are often shifted. Ibid.
The State gains in several Countreys by being common Cashier, Usurer, Ensurer, Monopolist, &c. 60
The case of the Jews (every where subject to great Taxes) briefly stated. 61.
The way of leavying an aliquot *part of mens estates very dangerous* Ibid.
Alterations in the values of Coins is a Tax upon such as live by determined Rents, Pensions, Fees, &c. 62
What is embasing of Moneys, and what is not. Ibid
Of Tin and Copper money, as well curiously as coursly wrought. Ibid.
Of the Tokens coined by retailing Shop-keepers. 63
What is Gold and Silver embased. Ibid.
The reasons for embasing of money. Ibid,
Reasons against the same. Ibid.
What is properly raising of Money. 64
The effect of raising both domestick and forreign Coins. Ibid.
Raising of money changes the species *of moneys, but lessens the Bullion.* 65
Why many wise States have raised their Moneys. Ibid.
Raising of Forreign money to a double value, or abating the price of our Native commodities to half, is all one, but the former is better. 66
The way of computing and comparing the prices of Commodities upon natural grounds. Ibid. 67

Men

Men are really and actually rich according to what they spend and enjoy in their own persons. 68
Excize being a Tax upon such riches, is a just way by which to defray the Publick Charge ibid.
That a proportion ought to be pitched between the Expence or Consumption of the whole Nation, and the Publick charge thereof. 69
Commodities ought not to be taxed until they be just ripe for Consumption. ibid.
Commodities of equal value may be unequally excized with justice. ibidem.
Of accumulating the Excize of many things upon some one thing 70
Whether Native Commodities exported ought to pay excize. ibid
The explication of accumulative Excize. ibid.
Reasons for accumulating the Excize of all things upon some one thing. ibid.
Why Beer ought not to be that one thing ibid.
Hearth or Smoak-money is an Accumulative Excize, with the reasons for and against it. 71
Reasons in behalf of the Excize. 72
Of framing persons to be fit for great Trusts, as to be Cashiers, Store-keepers, Checques, &c. ibid.

CHAP.

CHAP. I.

Of the ſeveral ſorts of Publick Charges.

THE Publick Charges of a State, are, *That of its Defenſe* by Land and Sea, of its Peace at home and abroad, as alſo of its honourable vindication from the injuries of other States; all which we may call the Charge of the Militia, which commonly is in ordinary as great as any other Branch of the whole; but extraordinary, (that is, in time of War, or fear of War) is much the greateſt.

2. Another branch of the Publick Charge is, the Maintenance of the Governours, Chief and Subordinate, I mean, ſuch not onely as ſpend their whole time in the Execution of their reſpective Offices, but alſo who ſpend much in fitting themſelves as well with abilities to that end, as in begetting an opinion in their Superiours of ſuch their ability and truſtworthineſs.

3. Which Maintenance of the Governours is to be in ſuch a degree of plenty and ſplendour, as private Endeavours and Callings ſeldom reach unto: To the end, that ſuch Governours may have the natural as well as the artificial Cauſes of Power to act with.

4. For if a great multitude of men ſhould call one of their number King, unleſs this inſtituted Prince, appear in greater viſible ſplendour than others, can reward thoſe that obey and pleaſe him, and do the contrary to others; his Inſtitution ſignifies little, even although he chance to have greater corporal or mental faculties, than any other of the number.

5. There be Offices which are but πόνοι, as Sheriffs, Justices of the Peace, Constables, Churchwardens, &c. which men may attend without much prejudice to their ordinary ways of livelihood, and for which the honour of being trusted, and the pleasure of being feared, hath been thought a competent Reward.

6. Unto this head, the Charge of the administring Justice may be referred, as well between man and man, as between the whole State or Commonalty and particular members of it; as well that of righting and punishing past injuries and crimes, as of preventing the same in time to come.

7. A third branch of the Publick Charge is, that of the *Pastorage of mens Souls*, and the guidance of their Consciences; which, one would think (because it respects another world, and but the particular interest of each man there) should not be a publick Charge in this: Nevertheless, if we consider how easie it is to elude the Laws of man, to commit unproveable crimes, to corrupt and divert Testimonies, to wrest the sense and meaning of the Laws, &c. there follows a necessity of contributing towards a publick Charge, wherewith to have men instructed in the Laws of God, that take notice of evil thoughts and designs, and much more of secret deeds, and that punisheth eternally in another world, what man can but slightly chastise in this.

8. Now those who labor in this publick Service, must also be maintained in a proportionable splendor; and must withall have the means to allure men with some kind of reward, even in this life; forasmuch, as many heretofore followed even Christ himself but for the Loaves he gave them.

9. Another Branch is, the Charge of Schools and Universities, especially for so much as they teach above *Reading*, *Writing* and *Arithmetick*; these being of particular use to every man, as being helps and substitutes of Memory and Reason, Reckoning being of the later, as Writing and Reading are of the former; for whether Divinity, &c. ought to be made a private Trade, is to be a question.

10. 'Tis true, that Schools and Colleges are now for the most part but the Donations of particular men, or places where

where particular men ſpend their money and time upon their own private accounts; but no doubt it were not amiſs, if the end of them were to furniſh all imaginable helps unto the higheſt and fineſt Natural Wits, towards the diſcovery of Nature in all its operations; in which ſenſe they ought to be a publick Charge: The which Wits ſhould not be ſelected for that work, according to the fond conceits of their own Parents and Friends, (Crows that think their own Birds ever faireſt) but rather by the approbation of others more impartial; ſuch as they are, who pick from out of the Chriſtians Children the ableſt Inſtruments and Support of the Turkiſh Government. Of which Selections more hereafter.

11. Another Branch is, that of the *Maintenance of Orphans, found and expoſed Children*, which alſo are Orphans; as alſo of Impotents of all ſorts, and moreover ſuch as want employment.

12. For the permitting of any to beg is a more chargeable way of maintaining them whom the law of Nature will not ſuffer to ſtarve, where food may poſſibly be had: Beſides, it is unjuſt to let any ſtarve, when we think it juſt to limit the wages of the poor, ſo as they can lay up nothing againſt the time of their impotency and want of work.

13. A laſt Branch may be, the Charge of High-wayes, Navigable Rivers, Aquæducts, Bridges, Havens, and other things of univerſal good and concernment.

14. Other Branches may be thought on, which let other men either refer unto theſe, or add over and above. For it ſuffices for my purpoſe to have for the preſent ſet down theſe the chief and moſt obvious of all the reſt.

CHAP. II.

Of the Cauſes which encreaſe and aggravate the ſeveral ſorts of Publick *Charges.*

HAving thus ſpoken of the ſeveral ſorts of Publick Charges, we ſhall next conſider the Cauſes which encreaſe them both in general and in particular.

Among the general Cauſes is, Firſt, the unwillingneſs of the people to pay them, ariſing from an opinion, that, by delay and reluctancy they may wholly avoid them, with a ſuſpition that what is impoſed is too much, or that what is collected is embezelled or ill expended, or that it is unequally leavied and aſſeſſed. All theſe reſolving into an unneceſſary Charge to collect them, and of forcing their Prince to hardſhips towards the people.

2. Another Cauſe which aggravates Taxes is, the force of paying them in money at a certain time, and not in commodities at the moſt convenient ſeaſons.

3. Thirdly, Obſcurities and doubts concerning the right of impoſing.

4. Fourthly, Scarcity of Money, and Confuſion of Coins.

5. Fifthly, Fewneſs of people, eſpecially of Labourers and Artificers.

6. Sixthly, Ignorance of the numbers, Wealth and Trade of the people, cauſing a needleſs repetition of the charge and trouble of new additional Levies, in order to amend miſtakes.

7. As to particulars. The Cauſes of encreaſing the Military Charge are the ſame with thoſe that encreaſe Wars, or fear of Wars, which are Forreign or Civil.

8. An Offenſive Forreign War is cauſed by many, and thoſe very various, ſecret, perſonal diſtaſtes coloured — with publick pretences; of which we can ſay nothing, but that the common encouragement unto them particularly here in *England* is a falſe opinion, that our Countrey is full peopled, or that if we wanted more Territory, we could take it with leſs charge from our neighbours, then purchaſe it from the *Americans*; and a miſtake, that the greatneſs and glory of a Prince lyeth rather in the extent of his Territory, then in the number, art, and induſtry of his people, well united and governed. And moreover, that it is more glorious to take from others by fraud or rapine, then to gain ones ſelf out of the bowels of the earth and ſea.

9. Now thoſe States are free from Forreign Offenſive Wars (ariſing as aboveſaid out of perſonal and private Cauſes)

ſes) where the chief Governours Revenue is but ſmall, and not ſufficient to carry on ſuch Wars, the which if they happen to be begun, and ſo far carryed on as to want general Contributions, then thoſe who have the power to impoſe them, do commonly enquire what private perſons and Ends occaſioned the War, and ſo fall upon the Authors, rather then contribute to the Effect; otherwiſe then to quench it,

10. Defenſive Wars are cauſed from unpreparedneſs of the offended State for war, as when defective Stores are ſerved into the Magazines by corrupt Officers at the rate of good; when Armies are falſly Muſtred; when Souldiers are either Tenants or Servants to their commanders, or elſe perſons, who for their Crimes or Debts, want protection from Juſtice; when the Officers are ignorant of their buſineſs, and abſent from their Commands; and withal afraid to puniſh, becauſe unwilling to pay. Wherefore to be alwayes in a poſture of War at home, is the cheapeſt way to keep off War from abroad.

11. The cauſes of Civil Wars here in *Europe* proceed very much from Religion, *viz.* the puniſhing of Believers heterodox from the Authorized way, in publike and open places, before great multitudes of ignorant people, with loſs of life, liberty, and limbs, rather then by well proportioned tolerable pecuniary mulcts, ſuch as every conſcientious Non-Conformiſt would gladly pay, and Hypocrites by refuſing, diſcover themſelves to be ſuch.

12. Civil Wars are likewiſe cauſed by peoples fanſying, that their own uneaſie condition may be beſt remedied by an univerſal confuſion; although indeed upon the upſhot of ſuch diſcorders they ſhall probably be in a worſe, even although they ſurvive and ſucceed, but more probably periſh in the conteſt.

13. Moreover, the peoples believing that forms of Government ſhall in a few years produce any conſiderable alteration as to the wealth of the ſubject; that the form which is moſt ancient and preſent is not the beſt for the place; that any eſtabliſhed family or perſon is not better then any new pretender, or even then the beſt Election that can be made; that Sovereignty is

invisible, and that it is not certainly annexed unto some certain person or persons.

14. Causes of Civil War are also, that the Wealth of the Nation is in too few mens hands, and that no certain means are provided to keep all men from a necessity either to beg, or steal, or be Souldiers. Moreover, the allowing Luxury in some, whilst others needlessly starve.

The dispensing of benefits upon casual and uncertain Motives, the giving vast Emoluments to persons and parties of no certain visible merit. These are the things which cause animosities among the totter-headed multitude, who are the tinder that the sparks of a few Designers may easily inflame.

15. One Cause of Publick Charge in matters of Religion, is the not having charged the limits of Parishes and Cures with the Change of Religion from Popery, and with the Changes in Plantation and Trade. For now when the Ministers of the Gospel preach unto multitudes assembled in one place, may not Parishes be bigger? that is, may not Flocks be more numerous, than when every particular sheep was, as heretofore, dresst and shorn three or four times *per annum* by Shrift. If there be in *England* and *Wales* but about five millions of people, what needs more than 5000. Parishes? that is, 1000. Sheep under every Shepheard. Whereas in the midling Parishes of *London* there are about 5000. souls in each. Upon which account there needs be in *England* and *Wales* but a 1000. Parishes, whereas there are near 10000.

16. Now the saving of half the Parishes, would (reckoning the Benefices one with another, but at 100 l. *per Annum* a piece) save 500000 l. Besides, when the number of Parochial Parsons were halved, then there would need but half the present number of Bishops, Deans and Chapters, Colledges and Cathedrals, which perhaps would amount to two or three hundred thousand pounds more: And yet the Church of God would be more regularly served than now, and that without prejudice to that sacred, antient Order of Episcopacy, and the way of their Maintenance by Tythes; and all this in a method of greater Reformation and suitableness thereunto.

17. But suppose it be said, that in some wild Countreys, a thousand

thouſand people do not live in a leſs ſcope of ground than of eight miles ſquare. To which I anſwer, that there are few or no ſuch places, the largeſt Pariſhes I know, being not more capacious than of three or four miles ſquare, in which is no difficulty, for the people to meet once a week at ſome central place within that ſcope.

18. Moreover I ſay, that a Curate of ſmall Learning, if of good life, and duly Ordained, may officiate in four Chappels of Eaſe every Sunday, and the Preacher, who indeed ſhould be a perſon of Learning and Eloquence, may preach every other Sunday in every of the ſaid Chappels, by preaching in two of them one day, and in the other two, the other day: And this with Catechizing, and Extra-Lectures upon the Week dayes, would perform as much as now is performed, and as much as by the bleſſing of God is neceſſary to ſalvation; for the yoake of Chriſt is eaſie, and his burthen light.

19. But to put an end to this doubt; I affirm, that if England and Wales were cut out in parcels of three miles ſquare, there would be found few above four thouſand ſuch, of which to make Pariſhes

20. Now if it be ſaid, that the Alienation of theſe Tythes is Sacriledge; I anſwer; that if the ſame be employed to defend the Church of God againſt the Turke and Pope and the Nations who adhere to them, it is not at all, or leſs, then to give ⅔. of the ſame to the Wives and Children of the Prieſts which were not in being when thoſe allowances were ſet forth?

21. If I had not an abhorrence from Propounding the leſſening of the Church Means, I could ſay, that the retrenching part of each remaining Parſons Tythes and Emoluments, and leaving them for Part, to the free Contributions of their Flocks, were a way to promote the Goſpel, and to give leſs offence to ſuch as think that their whole maintenance ſhould be made in that manner.

22. I might alſo ſay that foraſmuch as there be more Males then Females in *England*, (the ſaid diſproportion *pro tanto* hindering procreation) that it were good for the Miniſters to return to their Cælibat; or that none ſhould be Miniſters, whilſt

whilſt they were married, it being eaſie among five millions of people to finde out 5000. that could and would live ſingle, that is one in a thouſand. And then our unmarried Parſon might live as well with half, as now with the whole of his Benefice.

23. Allwayes provided, that though the number of Pariſhes, and the meaſure of Benefices were leſſened, yet that the ſame ought to be done without dammage to the preſent Incumbents.

24. As for leſſening the Charge of Offices relating to the Government and the Law, the ſame will conſiſt in aboliſhing the ſuperfluous, ſupernumerary, and antiquated; and withall, in retrenching the Fees of others, to what the labour, art, and truſt of their reſpective employments do require. For there be many Offices wholly executed by Deputies for ſmall wages, whereas the Maſters of them have ten times as much, although they know nothing either of what is done or ought to be done in the buſineſs.

25. Now ſuch Surpluſages as theſe ſhould be either reſtored unto the people who gave them unto the King, at a time when thoſe Fees made up but a Juſt reward for the Officer; or elſe the King keeping them ſtill might take them for ſo much toward the Publick Charge, but not give them away to ſtop the importunate ſuits of any particular perſon, in whom and in all his dependants, ſuch benefits do but cauſe a lazineſs as to the true original gain of the Nation, and themſelves in perticular, together with a total negligence and ignorance of the publick good.

26. Many are the particulars that might be inſtanced of this kinde; but my aim not being to prejudice any man in particular, I deſcend no lower, wiſhing onely that there might be an univerſal Reformation of what length of time hath warped awry, in which caſe no particular men are to be troubled; for if all ſuffer, none ſuffers, and all men would be no poorer then now they are if they ſhould loſe half their Eſtates; nor would they be a whit the richer if the ſame were doubled, the *Ratio formalis* of Riches lying rather in proportion then quantity.

27. To leſſen the charge of Univerſities, unto which I add the Inns of Court, which is not much, were to leſſen the number of the Students in Divinity, Law and Medicine, by leſſening the uſe of thoſe Profeſſions.

Now having ſpoken already of Divinity, I come next to the Law, and ſay; that if Regiſters were kept of all mens Eſtates in Lands, and of all the Conveyances of, and Engagements upon them; and withal if publick Loan-banks, Lombards, or Banks of Credit upon depoſited money, Plate, Jewels, Cloth, Wooll, Silk, Leather, Linnen, Mettals, and other durable Commodities, were erected, I cannot apprehend how there could be above one tenth part of the Law-ſuits and Writings, as now there are.

28. And moreover, if by accompt of the people, of their Land and other wealth, the number of Lawyers and Scriveners were adjuſted, I cannot conceive how there ſhould remain above one hundredth part of what now are, foraſmuch as I have heard ſome affirm, that there be now ten times as many as are even now neceſſary; and that there are now ten times as many Law-ſuits, as upon the above mentioned Reformation, there would be. It follows therefore that upon the whole there would not need one in a hundred of the preſent number of Retainers to the Law, and Offices of Juſtice; the occaſions as well of crimes as injuries being ſo much retrenched.

29. As for Phyſicians, it is not hard by the help of the obſervations which have been lately made upon the Bills of Mortality, to know how many are ſick in *London* by the number of them that dye, and by the proportions of the City to find out the ſame of the Countrey; and by both, by the advice of the learned Colledge of that Faculty to calculate how many Phyſicians were requiſite for the whole Nation, and conſequently, how many Students in that Art to permit and encourage; and laſtly, having calculated theſe numbers, to adopcate a proportion of Chyrurgeons, Apothecaries, and Nurſes to them, and ſo by the whole to cut off and extinguiſh that infinite ſwarm of vain pretenders unto, and abuſers of that God-like Faculty, which of all Secular Employments

our Saviour himself after he began to preach engaged himself upon.

30. Moreover, if it were agreed, what number of Divines, Physicians and Civilians (that is, of men bred in Universities) were requisite to the publick service? As suppose 13000. in the present way, and perhaps not above 6000. in that way of Retrenchment which we propound; then supposing that but one in forty dies *per annum*, it follows that less then 350. might suffice to be sent yearly out of the Universities: Where supposing they stay five years one with another, it followeth also that about 1800. is the number of Students fit to be allowed in the Universities at a time; I mean, of such as intend to make Learning their Trade and way of Livelihood.

31. I might intimate, that if 1800. Students were enough, and that if there were 40000. Parish Children and Foundlings in *England*, it were probable that one in twenty of them might be of excellent wit and towardness.

Now since the Publick may dispose of these Children as they please, and since there is Maintenance in both Universities for above 1800. what if our Professors of Art were in this manner selected and educated? But of this but *in transitu*.

32. Hereunto may be added, that by reason of Loan Banks afore mentioned, whereby the Credits and Estates of all Dealers may be known, and all the mysterious dangers of money prevented, and that by good Accompts of our growth, Manufacture, Consumption, and Importation, it might be known how many Merchants were able to mannage the Exchange of our superfluous Commodities with the same of other Countries: And also how many Retailers are needful to make the subdistributions into every Village of this Nation, and to receive back their superfluities. Upon these grounds I presume a large proportion of these also might be retrenched, who properly and originally earn nothing from the Publick, being onely a kind of Gamesters, that play with one another for the labours of the poor; yielding of themselves no fruit at all, otherwise then as veins and arteries, to distribute forth and back the bloud and nutritive juyces of the Body Politick, namely the product of Husbandry and Manufacture.

33. Now

33. Now if the numerous Offices and Fees relating to the Government, Law, and Church, and if the number of Divines, Lawyers, Phyſicians, Merchants, and Retailers were alſo leſſened, all which do receive great wages for little work done to the Publick, with how much greater eaſe would common expences be defraved? and with how much more equality would the ſame be aſſeſſed?

34. We enumerated ſix Branches of the Publick Charge, and have ſlightly ſpoken how four of them might be leſſened; we come next to the other two Brances, whereof we ſhall rather recommend the augmentation.

The firſt of theſe two Branches I call, generally ſpeaking, Care of the Poor, conſiſting of Receptacles for the aged, blind, lame, &c. in health; Hoſpitals for noiſome, chronical, curable and uncurable, inward and outward Diſeaſes. With others for acute and contagious. Others for Orphans, found and expoſed Children; of which later ſort none ſhould be refuſed, let the number be never ſo great, provided their names, families, and relations were well concealed: The choice of which Children being made at their being about eight or ten years old, might afford the King the fitteſt Inſtruments for all kind of his Affairs, and be as firmly obliged to be his faithful ſervants as his own natural Children.

35. This is no new nor rare thing, onely the neglect of it in theſe Countreys, is rather to be eſteemed a rare and new project: Nor is it unknown what excellent fruits there have been of this Inſtitution, of which we ſhall ſay much more, upon another occaſion hereafter.

36. When all helpleſs and impotent Perſons were thus provided for, and the lazy and thievish reſtrained and puniſhed by the Miniſter of Juſtice, it follows now that we find out certain conſtant Employments for all other indigent people, who labouring according to the Rules upon them, may require a ſufficiency of food and raiment. Their Children alſo if ſmall and impotent) as aforeſaid, being provided for elſewhere.

37. But what wall theſe Employments be? I anſwer, ſuch as were reckoned as the ſixth Branch of the Publick Expence,

viz. making all Highways so broad, firm, and even, a whereby the charge and tedium of Travelling and Carriages may be greatly lessened. The cutting and scowring of Rivers into Navigable; the planting of useful Trees for Timber, delight, and fruit in convenient places.

The making of Bridges and Cawseys.

The working in Mines, Quarries, and Colleries.

The Manufactures of Iron, &c.

38. I pitch upon all these particulars, first, as works wanting in this Nation; secondly as works of much Labour, and little Art; and thirdly, as introductive of new Trades into *England*, to supply that of Cloth, which we have almost totally lost.

In the next place it will be asked who shall pay these men? I answer, every body; for if there be 1000. men in a Territory, and if 100. of these can raise necessary food and raiment for the whole 1000. If 200. more make as much commodities, as other Nations will give either their commodities or money for, and if 400. more be employed in the ornaments, pleasure, and magnificence of the whole; if there be 200. Governours, Divines, Lawyers, Physicians, Merchants, and Retailers, making in all 900. the question is, since there is food enough for this supernumerary 100. also, how they should come by it? whether by begging or by stealing; or whether they shall suffer themselves to starve, finding no fruit of their begging, or being taken in their stealing be put to death another way? Or whether they shall be given away to another Nation that will take them? I think 'tis plain, they ought neither to be starved, nor hanged, nor given away; now if they beg, they may pine for hunger to day, and be gorged and glutted to morrow, which will occasion Diseases and evil habits, the same may be said of stealing; moreover, perhaps they may get either by begging or stealing more then will suffice them, which will for ever after indispose them to labour, even upon the greatest occasions which may suddenly and unexpectedly happen.

39. For all these Reasons, it will be certainly the safer way to afford them the superfluity which would otherwise be lost and wasted, or wantonly spent: Or in case there be no over-

plus

plus, then; 'tis fit to retrench a little from the delicacy of others feeding in quantity or quality; few men ſpending leſs then double of what might ſuffice them as to the bare neceſſities of nature.

40. Now as to the work of theſe ſupernumeraries, let it be without expence of Foreign Commodities, and then 'tis no matter if it be employed to build a uſeleſs Pyramid upon *Salisbury Plain*, bring the Stones at *Stonehenge* to *Tower-hill*, or the like; for at worſt this would keep their minds to diſcipline and obedience, and their bodies to a patience of more profitable labours when need ſhall require it.

41. In the next place, as an inſtance of the uſefulneſs of what hath been propounded, I ask what benefit will the mending of High-ways, the building of Bridges and Cawſeys, with making of Rivers Navigable produce, beſides the pleaſure and beauty of them? To which I alſo anſwer, as an inſtance of the premiſes, that the ſame, together with the numerous miſſions of Cattle and Sheep out of *Ireland*, ſhall produce a vaſt ſuperfluity of *Engliſh* Horſes, the which becauſe they have the many excellent qualities of Beauty, Strength, Courage, Swiftneſs, and Patience concentrated in them, beyond the Horſes of other places, would be a very vendible Commodity all over *Europe*; and ſuch as depending upon the intrinſeck nature of the *Engliſh* Soyl could not be counterfeited, nor taken away by others. Moreover, an Horſe is ſuch a Commodity as will carry both himſelf and his Merchant to the Market, be the ſame never ſo diſtant.

CHAP. III.

How the Cauſes of the unquiet bearing of Taxes may be leſſened.

WE have ſlightly gone through all the ſix Branches of the Publick Charge, and have (though imperfectly and

and in haſte) ſhewn what would encreaſe, and what would abate them.

We come next to take away ſome of the general Cauſes of the unquiet bearing of Taxes, and yielding to Contributions, viz.

2. 1. That the people think, the Sovereign asks more than he needs. To which we anſwer, 1. That if the Sovereign were ſure to have what he wanted in due time, it were his own great damage to draw away the money out of his Subjects hands, who by Trade increaſe it, and to hoard it up in his own Coffers, where 'tis of no uſe even to himſelf, but liable to be begged or vainly expended.

3. 2. Let the Tax be never ſo great, if it be proportionable unto all, then no man ſuffers the loſs of any Riches by it. For men (as we ſaid but now) if the Eſtates of them all were either halfed or doubled, would in both caſes remain equally rich. For they would each man have his former ſtate, dignity, and degree; and moreover, the Money leavied not going out of the Nation, the ſame alſo would remain as rich in compariſon of any other Nation; onely the Riches of the Prince & people would differ for a little while, namely, until the money leavied from ſome, were again refunded upon the ſame, or other perſons that paid it: In which caſe every man alſo ſhould have his chance and opportunity to be made the better or worſe by the new diſtribution; or if he loſt by one, yet to gain by another.

4. 3. Now that which angers men moſt, is to be taxed above their Neighbours. To which I anſwer, that many times theſe ſurmiſes are miſtakes, many times they are chances, which in the next Tax may run more favourable; and if they be by deſign, yet it cannot be imagined, that it was by deſign of the Sovereign, but of ſome temporary Aſſeſſor, whoſe turn it may be to receive the *Talio* upon the next occaſion from the very man he has wronged.

5. 4. Men repine much, if they think the Money leavyed will be expended on Entertainments, magnificent Shews, triumphal Arches, &c. To vvhich I anſvver, that the ſame is a refunding the ſaid Moneys to the Tradeſmen who work upon thoſe

thoſe things; which Trades, though they ſeem vain and onely of ornament, yet they refund preſently to the moſt uſeful; namely, to Brewers, Bakers, Taylours, Shoemakers, &c. Moreover, the Prince hath no more pleaſure in theſe Shews and Entertainments then 100000. others of his meaneſt Subjects have, whom, for all their grumbling, we ſee to travel many miles to be ſpectators of theſe miſtaken and diſtaſted vanities.

6. 5. The people often complain that the King beſtows the Money he raiſes from the People upon his Favourites: To which we anſwer; that what is given to Favourites, may at the next ſtep or tranſmigration, come into our own hands, or theirs, vvhom vve vviſh vvell, and think do deſerve it.

7. Secondly, as this man is a Favourite to day, ſo another, or our ſelves, may be hereafter; Favour being of a very ſlippery and moveable nature, and not ſuch a thing as we need much to envy; for the ſame vvay that-----leads up an hill, leads alſo down the ſame. Beſides, there is nothing in the Laws or Cuſtoms of *England*, which excludes any the meaneſt mans Child, from arriving to the higheſt Offices in this Kingdom, much leſs debars him from the Perſonal kindneſs of his Prince.

8. All theſe imaginations (whereunto the vulgar heads are ſubject) do cauſe a backwardneſs to pay, and that neceſſitates the Prince to ſeverity. Now this lighting upon ſome poor, though ſtubborn, ſtiff-necked Refuſer, charged with Wife and Children, gives the credulous great occaſion to complain of Oppreſſion, and breeds ill bloud as to all other matters; feeding the ill humours already in being.

9. 6. Ignorance of the Number, Trade, and Wealth of the people, is often the reaſon why the ſaid people are needleſly troubled, *viz.* with the double charge and vexation of two, or many Levies, when one might have ſerved: Examples whereof have been ſeen in late Poll-moneys; in which (by reaſon of not knowing the ſtate of the people, *viz.* how many there were of each Taxable ſort, and the vvant of ſenſible marks whereby to rate men, and the confounding of Eſtates vvith Titles and Offices) great miſtakes were committed.

10. Beſides, for not knowing the vvealth of the people, the

the Prince knows not what they can bear; and for not knowing the Trade, he can make no Judgement of the proper ſeaſon when to demand his Exhibitions.

11. 7. Obſcurities and doubts, about the right of impoſing, hath been the cauſe of great and ugly Reluctances in the people, and of involuntary Severities in the Prince; an eminent Example whereof was the Ship-money, no ſmall cauſe of twenty years calamity to the whole Kingdom.

12. 8. Fewneſs of people, is real poverty; and a Nation wherein are Eight Millions of people, are more then twice as rich as the ſame ſcope of Land wherein are but Four; For the ſame Governours which are the great charge, may ſerve near as well, for the greater, as the leſſer number.

13. Secondly, If the people be ſo few, as that they can live, *Ex ſponte Creatis*, or with little labour, ſuch as is grazing, *&c.* they become wholly without Art. No man that will not exerciſe his hands, being able to endure the tortures of the mind, which much thoughtfulneſs doth occaſion.

14. 9. Scarcity of money, is another cauſe of the bad payment of Taxes; for if we conſider, that of all the wealth of this Nation, *viz.* Lands Houſing, Shipping, Commodities, Furniture, Plate and Money, that ſcarce one part of an hundred is Coin; and that perhaps there is ſcarce ſix millions of Pounds now in *England*, that is but twenty ſhillings a head for every head in the Nation. We may eaſily judge, how difficult it is for men of competent eſtates, to pay a ſumme of money on a ſudden; which if they cannot compaſs, Severities, and Charges enſue; and that with reaſon, though unluckie enough, it being more tolerable to undoe one particular Member, then to endanger the whole, notwithſtanding indeed it be more tolerable for one particular Member to be undone with the whole, then alone.

15. 10. It ſeems ſomewhat hard, that all Taxes ſhould be paid in money, that is, (when the King hath occaſion to victual his Ships at *Portſmouth*) that fat Oxen and Corn ſhould not be received in kind, but that Farmers muſt firſt carry their Corn perhaps ten Miles to ſell, and turn into Money; which being paid to the King, is again reconverted into Corn, fetcht many miles further.

16. More-

16. Moreover, the Farmer for haſte is forced to under-ſell his Corn and the King for haſte likewiſe, is forced to over-buy his Proviſions. Whereas the paying in kind, *Pro Hic & Nunc*, would leſſen a conſiderable grievance to the poor people.

17. The next conſideration ſhall be of the conſequences, and effects of too great a Tax, not in reſpect of particular men, of which we have ſpoken before, but to the whole people in general: To which I ſay, that there is a certain meaſure, and proportion of money requiſite to drive the Trade of a Nation, more or leſs then which would prejudice the ſame. Juſt as there is a certain proportion of Farthings neceſſary in a ſmall retail Trade, to change ſilver money, and to even ſuch reckonings, as cannot be adjuſted with the ſmalleſt ſilver pieces. For money, (made of Gold and ſilver) is to the τὰ χρήσα (that is to the matter of our Food and Covering) but as Farthings, and other local extrinſick money, is to the Gold and ſilver ſpecies.

18. Now as the proportion of the number of farthings requiſite in commerce is to be taken from the number of people, the frequency of their Exchanges; as alſo, and principally from the value of the ſmalleſt ſilver pieces of money; ſo in like manner, the proportion of money requiſite to our Trade, is to be likewiſe taken from the frequency of commutations, and from the bigneſs of the payments that are by Law or Cuſtom uſually made otherwiſe. From whence it follows, that where there are Regiſters of Lands, whereby the juſt value of each mans intereſt in them may be well known; and where there are Depoſitories of the τὰ χρήσα, as of Metals, Cloth, Linnen, Leather, and other Uſefuls; and where there are Banks of money alſo, there leſs money is neceſſary to drive the Trade. For if all the greateſt payments be made in Lands, and the other perhaps down to ten pound, or twenty pound be made by credit in Lombars or Money-Banks: It follows that there needs onely money to pay ſums leſs then thoſe aforementioned; juſt as fewer Farthings are requiſite for change, where there be plenty of ſilver two Pences, then where the leaſt ſilver piece is ſix Pence.

19. To apply all this, I say, that if there be too much money in a Nation, it were good for the Commonalty, as well as the King, and no harm even to particular men, if the King had in his Coffers: all that is superfluous, no more then if men were permitted to pay their Taxes in any thing they could best spare.

23. On the other side, if the largeness of a publick Exhibition should leave less money then is necessary to drive the Nations Trade, then the mischief thereof would be the doing of less work, which is the same as lessening the people, or their Art and Industry, for a hundred pound passing a hundred hand for Wages, causes 10000l. worth of Commodities to be produced, which hands would have been idle and useless, had there not been this continual motive to their employment,

21. Taxes if they be presently expended upon our own Domestick Commodities, seem to me to do little harm to the whole Body of the people, onely they work a change in the Riches and Fortunes of particular men; and particularly by transferring the same from the Landed and Lazy, to the Crafty and Industrious. As for example, if a Gentleman have lett his Lands to Farm for a hundred pound *per annum*, for several years or Lives, and he be taxed twenty pound *per annum*, to maintain a Navy; then the effect hereof will be, that this Gentlemans Twenty pound *per annum*, will be distributed amongst Seamen, Ship-Carpenters, and other Trades relating to Naval matters; but if the Gentleman had the Land in his own hands, then being taxed a Fifth part, he would raise his Rents near the same proportion upon his under Tenants, or would sell his Cattle, Corn, and Wooll a Fifth part dearer; the like also would all other subdependents on him do; and thereby recover in some measure, what he paid. Lastly, but if all ths money leavyed were thrown into the Sea, then the ultimate effect would onely be, that every man must work a Fifth part the harder, or retrench a Fifth part of his Consumptions, *viz.* the former, if forreign Trade be improveable, and the latter, if it be not.

22. This I conceive, were the worst of Taxes in a well policyed

policyed State; but in other States, where is not a certain prevention of Beggary and Theevery, that is a ſure livelihood for men wanting imployment; there I muſt confeſs, an exceſſive Taxe, cauſes exceſſive and inſuperable want, even of natural neceſſities, and that on a ſudden, ſo as ignorant particular perſons, cannot find out what way to ſubſiſt by; and this by the law of Nature, muſt cauſe ſudden effects to relieve it ſelf, that is, Rapines, Frauds: and this again muſt bring Death, Mutilations, and Impriſonments, according to the preſent Laws which are Miſchiefs, and Puniſhments, as well unto the State, as to the particular ſufferers of them.

CHAP IV.

Of the ſeveral ways of Taxe, and firſt, of ſetting a part, a proportion of the whole Territory for Publick uſes, in the nature of Crown Lands; and ſecondly, by way of Aſſeſſement, or Land-taxe.

BUt ſuppoſing, that the ſeveral cauſes of Publick Charge are leſſened as much as may be, and that the people be well ſatisfied: and contented to pay their juſt ſhares of what is needful for their Government and Protection, as alſo for the Honour of their Prince and Countrey: It follows now to propoſe the ſeveral ways, and expedients, how the ſame may be moſt eaſily, ſpeedily, and inſenſibly collected. The which I ſhall do, by expoſing the conveniences and inconveniences of ſome of the principal ways of Levyings, uſed of later years within the ſeveral States of *Europe*: unto which others of ſmaller and more rarer uſe may be referred.

2. Imagine then, a number of people, planted in a Territory, who had upon Computation concluded, that two Miſſions of pounds *per annum*, is neceſſary to the publick charges. Or rather, who going more wiſely to work, had computed a

twenty fifth part of the proceed of all their Lands and Labours, were to be the *Exciſum*, or the part to be cut out, and laid aſide for publick uſes. Which proportions perhaps are fit enough to the affairs of *England*, but of that hereafter.

3. Now the queſtion is, how the one or the other ſhall be raiſed. The firſt way we propoſe, is, to Excize the very Land it ſelf in kind; that is, to cut out of the whole twenty five Millions, which are ſaid to be in *England* and *Wales*, as much Land *in ſpecie*, as whereof the Rack-rent would be two Millions, *viz.* about four Millions of Acres, which is about a ſixth part of the whole; making the ſaid four Milions to be Crown Lands, and as the four Counties intended to be reſerved in *Ireland* upon the forfeitures were. Or elſe to excize a ſixth part of the Rent of the whole, which is about the proportion, that the Adventurers and Souldiers in *Ireland* retribute to the King, as quit Rents. Of which two ways, the latter is manifeſtly the better, the King having more ſecurity, and more obligees; provided the trouble and charge of this univerſal Collection, exceed not that of the other advantage conſiderably.

4. This way in a new State would be good, being agreed upon, as it was in *Ireland*, before men had even the poſſeſſion of any Land at all; wherefore whoſoever buys Land in *Ireland* hereafter, is no more concerned with the Quit Rents wherewith they are charged, then if the Acres were ſo much the fewer; or then men are, who buy Land, out of which they know Tythes are to be paid. And truly that Countrey is happy, in which by Original Accord, ſuch a Rent is reſerved, as whereby the Publick charge may be born, without contingent, ſudden, ſuperadditions, in which lies the very *Ratio* of the burthen of all Contributions and Exactions. For in ſuch caſes as was ſaid before, it is not onely the Landlord pays, but every man who eats but an Egg, or an Onion of the growth of his Lands; or who uſeth the help of any Artiſan, which ſcedeth on the ſame.

5. But if the ſame were propounded in *England*, *viz.* if an aliquot part of every Landlords Rent were excinded or retrenched, then thoſe whoſe Rents were ſetled, and determin-

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ed for long times to come, would chiefly bear the burthen of such an Imposition, and others have a benefit thereby. For suppose *A.* and *B.* have each of them a parcel of Land, of equal goodness and value; suppose also that *A.* hath lett his parcel for twenty one years at twenty pound *per annum*, but that *B.* is free; now there comes out a Taxe of a fifth part; hereupon *B.* will not lett under 25*l.* that his remainder may be twenty, whereas *A.* must be contented with sixteen neat; nevertheless the Tenants of *A.* will sell the proceed of their bargain at the same rate, that the Tennats of *B.* shall do. The effect of all this is; First, that the Kings Fifth part of *B.* his Farm shall be greater then before. Secondly, that the Farmer to *B.* shall gain more then before the Taxe. Thirdly, that the Tenant or Farmer of *A.* shall gain as much as the King and Tenant to *B.* both. Fourthly, the Taxe doth ultimately light upon the Landlord *A.* and the Consumptioners. From whence it follows that a Land-taxe resolves into an irregular Excize upon Consumptions, that those bear it most, who least complain. And lastly, that some Landlords may gain, and onely such whose Rents are predetermined shall loose; and that doubly, *viz.* one way by the raising of their Revenues, and the other by Enhaunsing the prices of provisions upon them.

6. Another way is an *Excisium* out of the Rent of Housing, which is much more uncertain then that of Land. For an House is of a double nature, *viz.* one, wherein it is a way and means of expence; the other, as 'tis an Instrument and Tool of gain: for a Shop in *London* of less capacity and less charge in building then a fair Dining-Room in the same House, unto which both do belong, shall nevertheless be of the greater value, so also shall a Dungeon, Sellar, then a pleasant Chamber; because the one is expence, the other profit. Now the way of a Land-taxe rates housing, as of the latter nature, but the Excise as of the former.

7. We might add hereunto, that housing is sometimes disproportionally taxed to discourage Building, especially upon new Foundations, thereby to prevent the growth of a City; suppose *London*, such excessive and over-

grown

grown Cities being dangerous to Monarchy, though the more secure when the Supremacy is in Citizens of such places themselves, as in *Venice*.

8. But we say, that such checking of new Buildings signifies nothing to this purpose; forasmuch as Buildings do not encrease, until the People already have increased: but the remedy of the above-mentioned dangers is to be sought in the causes of the encrease of People, the which if they can be nipt, the other work will necessarily be done.

But what then is the true effect of forbidding to build upon new foundations? I answer to keep and fasten the City to its old seat and ground-plot, the which encouragement for new Buildings will remove, as it comes to pass almost in all great Cities, though insensibly, and not under many years progression.

9. The reason whereof is, because men are unwilling to build new houses at the charge of pulling down the old, where both the old house it self, and the ground it stands upon do make a much dearer ground-plot, for a new-house and yet far less free and convenient; wherefore men build upon new free foundations, and cobble up old houses, until they become fundamentally irreparable, at which time they become either the dwelling of the Rascality, or in process of time return to waste and Gardens again, examples whereof are many even about *London*.

Now if great Cities are naturally apt to remove their seats, I ask which way? I say in the case of *London*, it must be Westward, because the Winds blowing near ⅔ of the year from the West, the dwellings of the West end are so much the more free from the fumes, steams and stinks of the whole Easterly Pyle; which where Seacole is burnt is a great matter. Now if it follow from hence, that the Pallaces of the greatest men will remove Westward, it will also naturally follow, that the dwellings of others who do depend upon them will creep after them. This we see in *London*, where the Noblemens ancient Houses are now become Halls for Companies, or turned into Tenements, and all the Pallaces are gotten Westward; Insomuch, as I do not doubt but that five hundred years hence, the

the Kings Pallace will be near *Chelsy*, and the old building of *Whitehall* converted to uſes more anſwerable to their quality. For to build a new Royal Pallace upon the ſame ground will be too great a confinement, in reſpect of Gardens and other magnificencies, and withall, a diſaccomodation in the time of the work; but it rather ſeems to me, that the next Pallace will be built from the whole preſent contignation of houſes at ſuch a diſtance as the whole Pallace of *Weſtminſter* was from the City of *London*, when the Archers began to bend their bows juſt without *Ludgate*, and when all the ſpace between the *Thames*, *Fleet-ſtreet*, and *Holborn* was as *Finsbury-fields* are now.

10. This digreſſion I confeſs to be both impertinent to the buſineſs of Taxes, and in it ſelf almoſt needleſs; for why ſhould we trouble our ſelves what ſhall be five hundred years hence, not knowing what a day may bring forth; and ſince 'tis not unlikely, but that before that time we may be all tranſplanted from hence into *America*, the ſe Countreys being overrun with *Turks*, and made waſte, as the Seats of the famous Eaſtern Empires at this day are.

11. Onely I think 'tis certain, that while ever there are people in *England*, the greateſt cohabitation of them will be about the place which is now *London*, the *Thames* being the moſt commodious River of this Iſland, and the ſeat of *London* the moſt commodious part of the *Thames*; ſo much doth the means of facilitating Carriage greaten a City, which may put us in mind of employing our idle hands about mending the High-ways, making Bridges, Cawſeys, and Rivers navigable: Which conſiderations brings me back round into my way of Taxes, from whence I digreſt.

12. But before we talk too much of Rents, we ſhould endeavour to explain the myſterious nature of them, with reference as well to Money the Rent of which we call Uſury; as to that of Lands and Houſes, aforementioned.

13. Suppoſe a man could with his own hands plant a certain ſcope of Land with Corn, that is, could Digg, or Plough, Harrow, Weed, Reap, Carry home, Threſh, and Winnow ſo much as the Husbandry of this Land requires; and had withal

withal Seed wherewith to sowe the same. I say, that when this man hath subducted his seed out of the proceed of his Harvest, and also what himself hath both eaten and given to others in exchange for Clothes, and other Natural necessaries; that the Remainder of Corn, is the natural and true Rent of the Land for that year; and the *medium* of seven years, or rather of so many years as makes up the Cycle, within which Dearths and Plenties make their revolution, doth give the ordinary Rent of the Land in Corn.

14. But a further, though collateral question may be, how much *English* money this Corn or Rent is worth? I answer, so much as the money which another single man can save within the same time, over and above his expence, if he imployed himself wholly to produce and make it; *viz.* Let another man go travel into a Countrey where is Silver there Dig it, Refine it, bring it to the same place where the other man planted his Corn; Coyn it, *&c.* the same person, all the while of his working for Silver, gathering also food for his necessary livelihood, and procuring himself covering, *&c.* I say, the Silver of the one, must be esteemed of equal value with the Corn of the other: the one being perhaps twenty Ounces and the other twenty Bushels. From whence it follows that the price of a Bushel of this Corn to be an Ounce of Silver.

15. And forasmuch as possibly there may be more Art and Hazard in working about the Silver, then about the Corn, yet all comes to the same pass; for let a hundred men work ten years upon Corn, and the same number of men, the same time, upon Silver; I say, that the neat proceed of the Silver is the price of the whole neat proceed of the Corn, and like parts of the one, the price of like parts of the other. Although not so many of those who wroughte in Silver, learned the Art of Refining and Coyning, or out-lived the dangers and diseases of working in the Mines. And this also is the way of pitching the true proportion, between the values of Gold and Silver, which many times is set but by popular errour, sometimes more, sometimes less, diffused in the world; which error (by the way) is the cause of our having been pestred with too much Gold heretofore, and wanting it now.

16. This

16. This, I say to be the foundation of equalizing and ballancing of values; yet in the superstructures and practices hereupon, I confess there is much variety, and intricacy; of which hereafter.

17 The World measures things by Gold and Silver, but principally the latter; for there may not be two measures, and consequently the better of many must be the onely of all; that is, by fine Silver of a certain weight: but now if it be hard to measure the weight and fineness of silver, as by the different reports of the ablest Saymasters I have known it to be; and if silver granted to be of the same fineness and weight, rise and fall in its price, and be more worth at one place then another, not onely for being farther from the Mines, but for other accidents, and may be more worth at present, then a moneth or other small time hence; and if it differ in its proportion unto the several things valued by it, in several ages upon the increase and diminution thereof, we shall endeavour to examine some other natural Standards and Measures, without derogating from the excellent use of these.

18. Our Silver and Gold we call by several names, as in *England* by pounds, shillings, and pence, all which may be called and understood by either of the three. But that which I would say upon this matter is, that all things ought to be valued by two natural Denominations, which is Land and Labour; that is, we ought to say, a Ship or Garment is worth such a measure of Land, with such another measure of Labour; forasmuch as both Ships and Garments were the Creatures of Lands and mens Labours thereupon: This being true, we should be glad to find out a natural Par between Land and Labour, so as we might express the value by either of them alone as well or better then by both, and reduce one into the other as easily and certainly as we reduce pence into pounds. Wherefore we would be glad to find the natural values of the Fee simple of Land, though but no better then we have done that of the *usus fructus* abovementioned, which we attempt as followeth.

19. Having found the Rent or value of the *usus fructus per annum*, the question is, how many years purchase (as we usual-

ly say) is the Fee simple naturally worth? If we say an infinite number, then an acre of Land would be equal in value to a thousand Acres of the same Land; which is absurd, an infinity of unites being equal to an infinity of thousands. Wherefore we must pitch upon some limited number, and that I apprehend to be the number of years, which I conceive one man of fifty years old, another of twenty eight, and another of seven years old, all being alive together may be thought to live; that is to say, of a Grandfather, Father, and Child; few men having reason to take care of more remote Posterity: for if a man be a great Grandfather, he himself is so much the nearer his end, so as there are but three in a continual line of descent usually co-existing together; and as some are Grandfathers at forty years, yet as many are not till above sixty, and *sic de cæteris*.

20. Wherefore I pitch the number of years purchase, that any Land is naturally worth, to be the ordinary extent of three such persons their lives. Now in *England* we esteem three lives equal to one and twenty years, and consequently the value of Land, to be about the same number of years purchase. Possibly if they thought themselves mistaken in the one, (as the observator of the Bills of Mortality thinks they are) they would alter in the other, unless the consideration of the force of popular error and dependance of things already concatenated, did hinder them.

21. This I esteem to be the number of years purchase where Titles are good, and where there is a moral certainty of enjoying the purchase. But in other Countreys Lands are worth nearer thirty years purchase, by reason of the better Titles, more people, and perhaps truer opinion of the value and duration of three lives.

22. And in some places, Lands are worth yet more years purchase by reason of some special Honour, Pleasures, Priviledge or Jurisdiction annexed unto them.

23. On the other hand, Lands are worth fewer years purchase (as in *Ireland*) for the following reasons, which I have here set down, as unto the like whereof the cause of the like cheapness in any other place may be imputed.

First,

First, In *Ireland* by reason of the frequent Rebellions, (in which if you are conquered, all is loſt; or if you conquer, yet you are ſubject to ſwarms of thieves and robbers) and the envy which precedent miſſions of *Engliſh* have againſt the ſubſequent, perpetuity it ſelf is but forty years long, as within wh ch time ſome ugly diſturbance hath hitherto happened almoſt ever ſince the firſt coming of the *Engliſh* thither.

24. 2. The Claims upon Claims which each hath to the others Eſtates, and the facility of making good any pretence whatſoever by the favour of ſome one or other of the many Governours and Miniſters which within forty years ſhall be in power there; as alſo by the frequency of falſe teſtimonies, and abuſe of ſolemn Oaths.

25. 3. The paucity of Inhabitants, there being not above the 5th. part ſo many as the Territory would maintain, and of thoſe but a ſmall part do work at all, and yet a ſmaller work ſo much as in other Countreys.

26. 4. That a great part of the Eſtates both real and perſonal in *Ireland* are owned by Abſentees, and ſuch as draw over the profits raiſed out of *Ireland*, refunding nothing; ſo as *Iraland* exporting more then it imports doth yet grow poorer to a paradox.

27. 5. The difficulty of executing juſtice, ſo many of thoſe in power being themſelves protected by Offices, and protecting others. Moreover, the number of criminous and indebted perſons being great, they favour their like in Juries, Offices, and whereſoever they can: Beſides the Countrey is ſeldom rich enough to give due encouragement to profound Judges and Lawyers, which makes judgements very caſual; ignorant men being more bold to be apt and arbitrary, then ſuch as underſtand the dangers of it. But all this, a little care in due ſeaſon might remedy, ſo as to bring *Ireland* in a few years to the ſame level of value with other places; but of this alſo elſewhere more at large, for in the next place we ſhall come to Uſury.

CHAP. V.

Of Uſury.

WHat reaſon there is for taking or giving Intereſt or Uſury for any thing which we may certainly have again whenſoever we call for it, I ſee not; nor why Uſury ſhould be ſcrupled, where money or other neceſſaries valued by it, is lent to be paid at ſuch a time and place as the Borrower chuſeth, ſo as the Lender cannot have his money paid him back where and when himſelf pleaſeth, I alſo ſee not. Wherefore when a man giveth out his money upon condition that he may not demand it back until a certain time to come, whatſoever his own neceſſities ſhall be in the mean time, he certainly may take a compenſation for this inconvenience which he admits againſt himſelf: And this allowance is that we commonly call Uſury.

2. And when one man furniſheth another with money at ſome diſtant place, and engages under great penalties to pay him there, and at a certain day beſides; the conſideration for this, is that we call Exchange or local Uſury.

As for example, if a man wanting money at *Carliſle* in the heat of the late Civil Wars, when the way was full of Souldiers and Robbers, and the paſſage by Sea very long, troubleſome, and dangerous, and ſeldome paſſed; why might not another take much more then an 100*l.* at *London* for warranting the like ſum to be paid at *Carliſle* on a certain day?

3. Now the queſtions ariſing hence are; what are the natural Standards of Uſury and Exchange? As for Uſury, the leaſt that can be, is the Rent of ſo much Land as the money lent will buy, where the ſecurity is undoubted; but where the ſecurity is caſual, then a kind of enſurance muſt be enterwoven with the ſimple natural Intereſt, which may advance the Uſury very conſcionably unto any height below the Principal it ſelf. Now if things are ſo in *England*, that really there is no ſuch ſecurity as abovementioned, but that all are more or

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leſs hazardous, troubleſom, or chargeable to make; I ſee no reaſon for endeavouring to limit Uſury upon time, any more then that upon place, which the practice of the World doth not, unleſs it be that thoſe who make ſuch Laws were rather Borrowers then Lenders: But of the vanity and fruitleſneſs of making Civil Poſitive Laws againſt the Laws of Nature, I have ſpoken elſewhere, and inſtanced in ſeveral particulars.

4. As for the natural meaſures of Exchange, I ſay, that in times of Peace, the greateſt Exchange can be but the labour of carrying the money *in ſpecie*, but where are hazards and emergent uſes for money more in one place then another, *&c.* or opinions of theſe true or falſe, the Exchange will be governed by them.

4. Parallel unto this, is ſomething which we omitted concerning the price of Land; for as great need of money heightens Exchange, ſo doth great need of Corn raiſe the price of that likewiſe, and conſequently of the Rent of the Land that bears Corn, and laſtly of the Land it ſelf, as for example, if the Corn which feedeth *London*, or an Army, be brought forty miles thither, then the Corn growing within a mile of *London*, or the quarters of ſuch Army, ſhall have added unto its natural price, ſo much as the charge of bringing it thirty nine miles doth amount unto: And unto periſhable Commodities as freſh fiſh, fruits, *&c.* the enſurance upon the hazard of corrupting, *&c.* ſhall be added alſo; and finally unto him that eats theſe things there (ſuppoſe in Taverns) ſhall be added the charge of all the circumſtantial apparatus of Houſe-rent, Furniture, Attendance, and the Cooks skill as well as his labour to accompany the ſame.

6 Hence it comes to paſs, that Lands intrinſically alike near populous places, ſuch as were the perimeter of the Area that feeds them is great, will not onely yield more Rent for theſe Reaſons, but alſo more years purchaſe then in remote places, by reaſon of the pleaſure and honour extraordinary of having Lands there; for

—— *Omne tulit punctum qui miſcuit utile dulci.*

7. Having finiſhed our digreſſion upon the meaſures of the Rents and Values of Lands and Moneys, we now return to

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our ſecond way of leavying Publick Charges, which was the taking of a proportion of the Rent, (commonly called Aſſeſsment) it follows next to ſpeak of the way of computing the ſaid Rents, otherwiſe then according to the bargains which a few men make one with another, through ignorance, haſte, falſe ſuggeſtion, or elſe in their paſſion or drink: Although I acknowledge, that the medium or common reſult of all the bargains made within three years (or other ſuch Cycle of time, as within which all contingencies of Land revolve) may be very ſufficient to this purpoſe, being but the ſumme ſynthetically computed by caſual opinions, as I would endeavour to caſt up analytically by a diſtinct particularizing of the Cauſes.

8. 1. Therefore I propound a Survey of the Figures, Quantities, and Scituations of all the Lands both according to the civil bounds of Pariſhes, Farms, *&c.* and the natural diſtinctions thereof by the Sea, Rivers, ridges of Rocks, or Mountains, *&c.*

9. 2. I propound that the quality of each denomination were deſcribed by the Commodities it had uſually born, in ſome Land, ſome ſort of Timber, Grain, pulſe or root growing more happily then in others: Alſo by the encreaſe of things ſown or planted, which it hath yielded *communibus annis*; and withal, the comparative goodneſs of the ſaid Commodities not unto the common Standard money, but to one another. As for example; if there be ten Acres of Land, I would have it judged whether they be better for Hay or Corn; if for Hay, whether the ſaid ten Acres will bear more or leſs of Hay then ten other Acres; and whether an hundred weight of the ſaid Hay will feed or fatten more or leſs, then the ſame weight of other Hay, and not as yet comparing it to money, in which the value of the ſaid Hay will be more or leſs, according to the plenty of money, which hath changed ſtrangely ſince the diſcovery of the *Weſt-Indies*, and according to the multitudes of people living near this Land, together with the luxurious or frugal living of them; and beſides all according to the Civil, Natural, and Religious Opinions of the ſaid people: As for example, Eggs in the fore-part of Lent

Lent (becauſe their goodneſs and delicacy decays before Lent be done) being worth little in ſome *Popiſh* Countreys; nor Swines fleſh among the *Jews*, nor Hedgehogs, Frogs, Snails, Muſhrooms, *&c.* to thoſe that fear to eat them, as poiſonous or unwholeſom; nor Currans, and *Spaniſh* Wines, if they were all to be deſtroyed as the great thieves of this Nation, by an Edict of the State.

10. This I call a Survey or Inquiſition into the former intrinſick values of Land, this latter of extrinſick or accidental follows. We ſaid, that the change of the ſtore of money would change the rates of commodities according to our reckoning in names and words, (pounds, ſhillings and pence being nothing elſe) as for example:

If a man can bring to *London* an ounce of Silver out of the Earth in *Peru*, in the ſame time that he can produce a buſhel of Corn, then one is the natural price of the other; now if by reaſon of new and more eaſie Mines a man can get two ounces of Silver as eaſily as formerly he did one, then Corn will be as cheap at ten ſhillings the buſhel, as it was before at five ſhillings *cæteris paribus*.

11 It behoves us therefore to have a way, whereby to tell the money of our Countrey (which I think I have, and that in a ſhort time, and that without coſt, and (which is more) without looking into particular mens pockets; of which hereafter.) Now if we know what Gold and Silver we had in *England* two hundred years ago, and could tell it again now; and though we alſo knew the difference of our denominations then, when thirty ſeven ſhillings were made out the ſame quantity of Silver as ſixty two are now; alſo that of the alloy, labour in Coinage, remedies for weight and fineneſs, and duties to the King; nay, if we alſo knew the Labourers wages then and now, yet all this would not ſhew the difference of the Riches of our Nation even in mony alone.

12, Wherefore we muſt add to the premiſes the knowledge of the difference of the numbers of the people, and conclude, that if all the money in the Nation were equally divided amongſt all the People both then and now, that that time wherein each Deviſee had wherewith to hire moſt labourers,

ers was the richer. So that we want the knowledge of the People and Ballion which is now in this Land, and which was heretofore; all which I think may be found out even for the time past, but more probably for the time present and to come.

13. But to proceed; suppose we had them, then we would pitch the accidental values upon our Lands about *London*; as thus, *viz.* We would first at hazard compute the materials for food and covering, which the Shires of *Essex*, *Kent*, *Surrey*, *Middlesex* and *Hertford*, next circumjacent to *London*, did *communibus annis* produce; and would withal compute the Consumptioners of them living in the said five Shires and *London*. The which if I found to be more then were the Consumptioners living upon the like scope of other Land, or rather upon as much other Land as bore the like quantity of Provisions. Then I say, that Provisions must be dearer in the said five Shires then in the other; and within the said Shires cheaper or dearer as the way to *London* was more or less long, or rather more or less chargeable.

14. For if the said five Shires did already produce as much Commodity, as by all endeavour was possible; then what is wanting must be brought from a far, and that which is near, advanced in price accordingly; or if the said Shires by greater labour then now is used, (as by Digging instead of Ploughing, Setting instead of Sowing, picking of choice Seed instead of taking it Promiscuously, Steeping it instead of using it wholly unprepared, and manuring the ground with Salt instead of rotten Straw, *&c.*) could be fertilized then will the Rent be as much more advanced, as the excess of encrease exceeds that of the labour.

15. Now the price of labour must be certain, (as we see it made by the Statutes which limit the day wages of several workmen;) the non-observance of which Laws, and the not adapting them to the change of times, is by the way very dangerous, and confusive to all endeavours of bettering the Trade of the Nation.

16. Moreover, the Touchstone to try whether it be better to use those improvements or not, is to examine whether the labour of fetching these things even from the places where they

they grow wild, or with leſs Culture, be not leſs then that of the ſaid improvements.

17. Againſt all this will be objected, that theſe computations are very hard if not impoſſible to make; to which I anſwer onely this, that they are ſo, eſpecially if none will trouble their hands or heads to make them, or give authority for ſo doing: But withall, I ſay, that until this be done, Trade will be too conjectural a work for any man to employ his thoughts about; for it will be the ſame wiſdom in order to win with fair Dice, to ſpend much time in conſidering how to hold them, how much to ſhake them, and how hard to throw them, and on what angles they ſhould hit the ſide of the Tables, as to conſider how to advance the Trade of this Nation; where at preſent particular men get from their neighbours (not from the Earth and Sea) rather by hit then wit, and by the falſe opinions of others, rather then their own judgements; Credit every where, but chiefly in *London*, being become a meer conceit, that a man is reſponſible or not, without any certain knowledge of his Wealth or true Eſtate. Whereas I think the nature of credit ſhould be limited onely to an opinion of a mans faculties to get by his Art and Induſtry. The way of knowing his Eſtate being to be made certain, and the way of making him pay what he ows to the utmoſt of his ability, being to be expected from the good execution of our Laws.

18. I ſhould here enlarge upon a Paradox, to prove that if every mans Eſtate could be always read in his forehead, our Trade would much be advanced thereby, although the poorer ambitious man be commonly the more induſtrious. But of this elſewhere.

19. The next objection againſt this ſo exact computation of the Rents and worth of Lands, *&c.* is that the Sovereign would know too exactly every mans Eſtate; to which I anſwer, that if the Charge of the Nation be brought as low as it may be, (which depends much upon the People in Parliament to do) and if the people be willing and ready to pay, and if care be taken, that although they have not ready money, the credit of their Lands and Goods ſhall be as good; and laſtly, that it would be a great diſcommodity to the Prince to

take more then he needs, as was proved before; where is the evil of this ſo exact knowledge? And as for the proportion of every Contributor, why ſhould any man hope or expect to eaſe himſelf by his craft and intereſt in a confuſion? or why ſhould he not fear, though he may be advantaged this time, to ſuffer in the next.

CHAP. VI.

Of Cuſtoms and Free Ports.

CUſtom is a Contribution or Exciſium out of Goods ſent out or imported into the Princes Dominions: In theſe Countries of a twentieth part not according to the Prices currant among Merchants of each reſpective Commodity, but according to other ſtanding Rates ſet by the State, though adviſed for the moſt part by concerned Perſons.

2. I cannot well imagine what ſhould be the natural Reaſons, why a Prince ſhould be paid this duty inward and outward both; there ſeems indeed to be ſome, why he ſhould be paid for indulging the Exportation of ſome ſuch things as other Countreys do really want.

3. Wherefore I think, that Cuſtoms at the firſt were a *premium* allowed the Prince for protecting the carriage of Goods both inward and outward from the Pyrats; and this I ſhould verily believe, if the Prince were bound to make good loſſes of that kind. And I thought that the proportion of five pound *per cent.* was pitched upon computation, that the Merchants before the ſaid undertaking and compoſition, had uſually loſt more by Pyracy: And finally, that the Cuſtoms had been an enſurance upon loſſes by enemies, as the enſurance now uſual, is of the caſualties of Sea, Wind, Weather, and Veſſel, or altogether; or like the enſurance in ſome Countries of Houſes from Fires for a certain ſmall part of their yearly Rent. But be it what it will, it is anciently eſtabliſhed by Law, and ought to be paid until it ſhall be aboliſhed. Onely I take leave as an idle Philoſopher to diſcourſe upon the Nature and Meaſures of it.

4. The

4. The Meaſures of Cuſtoms outwards may be ſuch, as after reaſonable profit to the Exporter will leave ſuch of our own Commodities as are neceſſary to Forreigners ſomewhat cheaper unto them then they can be had from elſewhere.

As for example, Tin is a Native Commodity, which governs the Market abroad, that is, there is none ſo good and ſo eaſie to be had and exported.

Now ſuppoſe Tin might be made in *Cornwall* for four pence the pound, and that the ſame would yield twelve pence at the neareſt part in *France*, I ſay, that this extraordinary profit ought to be eſteemed as a Mine Royal, or *Treſor Trovè*, and the Sovereign ought to have his ſhare in it: Which he will have, by impoſing ſo great a duty upon Tin Exported, as on one ſide may leave a ſubſiſtence to the Workmen, (and no more) with a competent profit to the owners of the ground; and on the other ſide may leave the price abroad leſs then that for which Tin may be had from any other place.

5. The ſame Impoſition might alſo be made on the Tin ſpent at home, unleſs it be as impoſſible ſo to do, as for the King of *France* to impoſe the Gabel upon Salt in the very places where it is made.

6. But it is obſerved, that ſuch high Duties make men endeavour not to enter any ſuch Goods at all, or pay for them, provided the charge of ſmuckling and bribing, with the hazzard of being ſeized do not *communibus vicibus* exceed the Duty.

7. Wherefore the meaſures of this Nature are, that it be more eaſie, ſafe, and profitable for men to keep the Law, then to break it unleſs it be in ſuch caſes, where the Magiſtrate can with certainty execute the Law. As for example, it would be hard to ſave the Duties upon Horſes ſhipped at a ſmall Port, without adjacent Creeks, and that but ſome certain two hours every Tide, foraſmuch as Horſes cannot be diſguiſed, put up in bags or casks, nor ſhipped without noiſe and the help of many hands.

8. The Meaſures of Cuſtoms upon imported Commodities are; 1. That all things ready and ripe for Conſumption may be made ſomewhat dearer then the ſame things grown or made at home; if the ſame be feaſible *cæteris paribus*.

8. That all superfluities tending to Luxury and sin, might be loaded with so much Impost, as to serve instead of a sumptuary Law to restrain the use of them. But here also care is to be had that it be not better to smuckle them to pay.

9. On the contrary, all things not fully wrought and Manufactured, as raw Hides, Wooll, Beaver, Raw-Silk, Cotton; as also all Tools and Materials for Manufacture, as also Dying-stuff, *&c.* ought to be gently dealt with.

10. If to leavy the payment of these Duties could be most exactly performed, Princes might strangely practice one upon another; wherefore since they cannot, the people pay no more then they cannot with greater safety upon the whole matter save, nor observe any more of these Laws, then they cannot elude.

11. The inconveniences of the way of Customs, are *viz.*

1. That Duties are laid upon things not yet ripe for use, upon Commodities in *fieri*, and but in the way of their full improvements, which seems the same ill-Husbandry, as to make Fuel of young Saplings, instead of Dotards and Pollards.

2. The great number of Officers requisite to Collect the said Duties, especially in a Countrey where the Harbours are many, and the Tides convenient for shipping of Goods at any time.

3. The great facility of smuckling by Briberies, Collusions, hiding and disguising of Commodities, *&c.* and all this notwithstanding Oaths and Penalties, and withall by the several ways of mitigating and taking off the said Penalties even after discovery.

4. The Customs or Duties upon the few Commodities of the growth of *England* exchanged with Forreigners, make too small a part of the whole expence of the people of this Kingdom, which (perhaps is not less then fifty millions of pounds *per annum*) out of which to bear the common charges thereof, so as some other way of Leavy must be practised together with it; whereas by some one way, if the best, the whole work may be absolved: wherefore 'tis an inconvenience in the way of Customs, that it necessitates other ways then it self.

12. Now

12. Now as a ſmall attempt of a Remedy or Expedient herein, I offer rather, that inſtead of the Cuſtoms upon Goods ſhipped, every Ship that goes in or out, may pay a Tonnage, the ſame being collectible by a very few hands, as a matter viſible to all the World; and that the ſaid Duty be but ſuch a part of the Fraight, as the like whereof being excinded out of the whole Conſumption, would defray all the Publick Charge; which part perhaps is 4. *per Cent.* or thereabouts, *viz.* two millions *per annum* out of fifty.

13. The other is, that the Cuſtoms be reduced into the nature of an Enſurance *premium*, and that the ſame be augmented and fitted, as whereby the King may afford to enſure the Goods as well againſt the Sea as Enemies; by which means the whole Nation would be concerned in all ſuch loſſes, and then the Merchant for his own ſake would more willingly enter and pay for whatſoever he would have enſured.

14. But it will be here objected, that although the duty of Cuſtoms be abrogated, yet that there muſt be always the ſame number of Officers maintained as now to prevent the bringing in and carrying out of prohibited Commodities. Wherefore we ſhall here ſtate the nature of ſuch Prohibitions by two or three grand inſtances.

15. To prohibit the Exportation of Money, in that it is a thing almoſt impracticable, it is almoſt nugatory and vain; And the danger of it reſolves either into a kind of Enſurance anſwerable to the danger of being ſeized, or unto a Surcharge of a Compoſition by bribing the Searchers. As for example, If but one in fifty Exportations are ſeized, or if twenty ſhillings be uſually taken for conniving at fifty pounds, then the Commodities bought with this Money muſt be ſold two at leaſt *per cent.* the dearer to the Conſumptioner. Now if the Trade will not bear this Surcharge, then Money will not be exported with diſcretion. Now the uſe of this Prohibition, ſuppoſing it practicable, is to ſerve as a ſumptuary Law, and to bind the Nation in general not to ſpend more then they get; for if we could export no Commodity of our own growth or Manufacture then by prohibiting the going out of Money, it is alſo *ipſo facto* commanded that nothing forreign

ſhould

should be brought in. Again supposing, that ordinarily we export enough to furnish us with all Forreign Commodities, but upon some extraordinary decay of our Land or hands, we are able to export but half as much as would procure our ordinary proportion of Foreign Goods, then the Prohibition of Money performs indeed the part of a sumptuary Law, in hindring us to bring in any more then half as much Forreign Commodities as we formerly used, onely it leaves it to the discretion of the Merchant, to choose which he will neglect or forbear to bring in, and which not; whereas in sumptuary Laws the State taketh this care upon themselves. As for example, If we wanted Exportations to ballance our Importations by forty thousand pounds, and suppose for examples sake, that the Importation of forty thousand pounds worth of Coffee-Berries, or the like of *Spanish* Wine must be retrenched; in this case, the said Prohibition of Money will do one, or some of the one, and some of the other as the Merchant himself pleases: But the sumptuary Law determines, whether we shall encourage and keep fair with the Nation that sends us Wine, rather then that which sends us Coffee, and whether the Expence of Wine or Coffee be most prejudicial to our people, *&c.*

16. The benefits alledged for the free Exportation of Money is meerly this, *viz.* That if a Ship carrying out of *England* forty thousand pounds worth of Cloth, might also carry with it forty thousands pounds in Money, then could the Merchant stand the stiffer upon his terms, and in fine would buy cheaper, and sell dearer; but by the way, the Merchant buys this power with the Interest and of the Money he carries, which if it amount to five pound *per Cent.* then he had better sold his Goods at four pound *per Cent.* under rate, then to have fortified himself with Moneys as aforesaid. But of this more may be said, we hasten to the great point of Wooll.

17. The *Hollanders* having gotten away our Manufacture of Cloth, by becoming able to work with more Art, to labour and fare harder, to take less fraight, Duties and Ensurance, hath so maddled us here in *England*, that we have been

apt

apt to think of ſuch exorbitantly fierce ways of prohibiting Wooll and Earth to be Exported, as perhaps would do us twice as much harm as the loſs of our ſaid Trade. Wherefore to return to our Wits and Trade again, before we can tell what to do in this caſe, we muſt conſider;

1. That we are often forced to buy Corn from abroad, and as often complain that we are peſtered with abundance of idle hands at home, and withall that we cannot vend the Woollen Manufactures even which our few working hands do produce. In this caſe were it not better to leſſen our Sheep-Trade, and convert our hands to more Tillage? Becauſe 1. Fleſh becoming dearer, there would be encouragement for Fiſh, which will never be till then. 2. Our Money would not run ſo faſt away for Corn. 3. We ſhould have no ſuch Gluts of Wooll upon our hands. 4. Our idle hands would be employed in Tillage and Fiſhing, one man by the way of grazing, tilling as it were many thouſand Acres of Land by himſelf and his Dog.

2. Suppoſe we wanted no Corn, nor had any idle hands, and yet that we abounded with more Wooll then we can work up; in this caſe, certainly Wooll might be Exported, becauſe 'tis ſuppoſed, that the hands which work, are already employed upon a better Trade.

3. Suppoſe the *Hollander* out-do us by more Art, were it not better to draw over a number of their choice Workmen, or ſend our moſt ingenious men thither to learn; which if they ſucced; it is moſt manifeſt, that this were the more natural way, then to keep that infinite clutter about reſiſting of Nature, ſtopping up the Winds and Seas, *&c.*

4. If we can make Victual much cheaper here then in *Holland*, take away burthenſome, frivilous, and antiquated Impoſitions and Offices.

I conceive even this were better then to perſwade Water to riſe of it ſelf above its natural Spring.

5. We muſt conſider in general, that as wiſer Phyſicians tamper not exceſſively with their Patients, rather obſerving and complying with the motions of Nature, then contradicting it with vehement Adminiſtrations of their own; ſo in Politicks and Oeconomicks the ſame muſt be uſed; for *Natu-*

Naturam expellas furcâ licet usque recurrit.

18. Nevertheless, if the *Hollanders* advantages in making Cloth be but small and few in comparison of ours, that is, if they have but a little the better of us, then I conceive that Prohibitions to Export Wooll may sufficiently turn the scales. But whether this be so or not, I leave to others, being my self neither Merchant nor Statesman.

19. As for Prohibition of Importations, I say that it needs not be, until they much exceed our Exportations. For if we should think it hard to give good necessary Cloth for debauching Wines, yet if we cannot dispose of our Cloth to others, 'twere better to give it for Wine or worse, then to cease making it; nay, better to burn a thousand mens labours for a time, then to let those thousand men by non-employment lose their faculty of Labouring. In brief, what may be further said hereupon, resolves into the Doctrine and *Ingenium* of making sumptuary Laws, and judicious use of them *pro hic & nunc*.

20. Unto this Discourse of Customs appertains that of Free Ports, which (in a Nation that onely Trades for it self, *viz.* vents its own superfluities, and Imports onely Necessaries for it self) are of no use, but rather harm; for suppose Wines be brought into a free Port, be there Housed and privately sold, but the Cask filled up with stained water, and put on Ship-board again to be staved as soon as the Ship is out at sea: In this case, the Duties of those Wines are defrauded, as it also may be many other ways.

21. Now if it be said, that although we should Trade but for our selves, yet that our Ports (being more commodious then those of other Nations) would be the more frequented; for being free, and consequently the more enriched, by the expence of Seamen and Passengers, hire of Labourers, and VVare-houses, *&c.* even without any Custom at all upon the Goods. Nevertheless 'tis reason that a small Duty should be paid upon the Ship as aforesaid, for such use of our Ports, and that *eo nomine*; not expecting all our Benefit from the said hire of Cellaridge, Porters and Carmen, which also might be had over and above for their proper reasons.

22. But

12. But if we could attain to be the Merchants between other Nations, there is then no reason for exacting Duties (as was said before) upon things *in fieri*, and which are but in the way of their improvement: And as for the fraud that may be committed, as in the case of Wines abovementioned, I affirm that our Excize upon the Consumption, would overcome and elude them.

CHAP. VII.

Of Poll-money.

POll-money is a Tax upon the Persons of men, either upon all simply and indifferently, or else according to some known Title or mark of distinction upon each; and that either of bare honour, or else of some Office sought or imposed, or of some Faculty and Calling without respect to Riches or Poverty, Incomes or Expence, Gain or Loss accrewing by the said Title, Office, or Faculty.

2. The Poll-moneys which have been leavied of late have been wonderfully confused; as taxing some rich single persons at the lowest rate; some Knights, though wanting necessaries, at twenty pounds, encourageing some vain fellows to pay as Esquires, on purpose to have themselves written Esquires in the Receipts; making some pay ten pounds as Doctors of Physick or Law, who get nothing by the Faculty, nor mind the practice; making some poor Tradesmen forced to be of the Liveries of their Companies to pay beyond their strength; and lastly, some to pay according to their Estates, the same to be valued by those that know them not; thereby also giving opportunity to some Bankrupts to make the world credit them as men of such Estates, at which the Assessors did rate them by Collusion.

3. So as by this Confusion, Arbitraries, Irregularities, and hotch-pot of Qualifications, no estimate could be made of the fitness of this Plaister to the Sore, nor no Check or way to examine whether the respective Receipts were duly accompted for, *&c.*

4 Wherefore wholly rejecting the said complicated way of Tax, I shall speak of Poll-money more distinctly, and first of the simple Poll-money upon every head of all mankind alike; the Parish paying for those that receive Alms, Parents for their Children under age, and Masters for their Apprentices and others who receive no wages.

5. The evil of this way is, that it is very unequal; men of unequal abilities, all paying alike, and those who have greatest charges of Children paying most; that is, that by how much the poorer they are, by so much the harder are they taxed.

6. The Conveniences are; first, that it may be suddenly collected, and with small charge: Secondly, that the number of the people being always known, it may be sufficiently computed what the same will amount unto. Thirdly, It seems to be a spur unto all men, to set their Children to some profitable employment upon their very first capacity, out of the proceed whereof, to pay each child his own Poll-money.

7. The next Poll-money is upon every head, but distinguished by Titles of meer Honour, without any kind of Office or Faculty; as Dukes, Marquesses, Earls, Viscounts, Barons, Baronets, Knights and Esquires, *viz.* the eldest Sons of Knights *in perpetuum*, and Gentlemen if they write themselves so. This way is much more equal then the other; forasmuch as those who are Titled, are for the most part rich proportionably; or if they were not, yet men so dignified shall command a preheminence and place, even although they do not or cannot buy it of the vulgar by their Expence: my meaning hereby is, that a Title may possibly save a man as much as his Poll-money may exceed the Plebian Level by reason of such title.

8 Moreover, good and multiform Accompts being kept of the People, this Tax may be also easily speedily and inexpensively collected; and also being capable of being computed aforehand, may be fitted and seized according to the needs of the Prince.

9. As for Offices, they are indeed Dignities for the most part, but paid for by the trouble of administring them; as for example, to be an Alderman suppose of *London*, is indeed an honour

honour, yet many pay five hundred pounds to be excuſed from receiving it.

Nevertheleſs it may not be improper to Tax Offices ſought, or ſuch as are accepted although they might be refuſed: And on the other ſide no *Tituladoe* ſhould be forced to pay Poll-money according to his Title, if he be contented to lay it down, and never reſume it more.

10. The Titles of Faculties and Callings ought to be no Qualification in a Poll-money, becauſe they do not neceſſarily nor probably infer ability to pay, but carry with them vaſte inequalities. But therefore if a man by his Licence to practiſe get much, it may be preſumed he will ſpend accordingly; in which net the way of Excize will certainly take him, as it will all the Officers aforementioned.

11. Hearth-money ſeems to be a Poll-money, but is not, being rather a way of Accumulative Excize; of which hereafter.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Lotteries.

MEn that accept Titles may foreſee, that they may be Taxed by them as aforeſaid, (although it be unlikely (one Houſe of Parliament being all *Tituladoes*, and the greateſt part of the other being ſuch alſo) that any ſuch way of Leavy ſhould paſs) and therefore they do as it were *à priori* conſent unto the Tax in their own Individuals.

2. Now in the way of Lottery men do alſo Tax themſelves in the general, though out of hopes of Advantage in particular: A Lottery therefore is properly a Tax upon unfortunate ſelf-conceited fools; men that have good opinion of their own luckineſs, or that have believed ſome Fortune-teller or Aſtrologer, who had promiſed them great ſucceſs about the time and place of the Lottery, lying Southweſt perhaps from the place where the deſtiny was read.

3. Now becauſe the World abounds with this kind of fools, it is not fit that every man that will, may cheat every man that

would be cheated; but it is rather ordained, that the Sovereign ſhould have the Guardianſhip of theſe fools, or that ſome Favourite ſhould beg the Sovereigns right of taking advantage of ſuch mens folly, even as in the caſe of Lunaticks and Idiots.

4. Wherefore a Lottery is not tollerated without authority, aſſigning the proportion in which the people ſhall pay for their errors, and taking care that they be not ſo much and ſo often couzened, as they themſelves would be.

5. This way of Lottery is uſed but for ſmall Levies, and rather upon privato-publick Accompts, (then for maintaining Armies or Equipping Fleets,) ſuch as are Aque-Ducts, Bridges, and perhaps Highways, *&c.* Wherefore we ſhall ſay no more of it upon this occaſion.

CHAP. IX.

Of Benevolence.

THe raiſing of Money by Benevolence, ſeems to be no force upon any man, nor to take from any man but what himſelf knows he can ſpare, nevertheleſs there is more in it; for to be but brow-beaten by a Prince or Grandee, proves often as heavy as to be diſtrained upon for an Aſſeſsment or Subſidy; and the danger of being miſrepreſented by linſy Pickthanks and Informers as diſaffected to the Cauſe for which the Leavy is made, is more frequent then the payment of any ſum in a due proportion with all other men (which I have ſaid is no impoveriſhment) can poſſibly be hurtful.

The benefits of this way are theſe, *viz.* That foraſmuch as it ſometimes falls out (as in the late Differences with the *Scots*, *annis* 1638. and 1639. when the Church Dignitaries were moſt concerned) that the cauſe of the Expence concerns ſome men more then others, that then an Impoſition ſhould not paſs upon all for the ſakes of a part; Sometimes it happens that one ſort of men have received greater and freſher favours then another; as upon the late Reſtauration of his

his Majesty *Anno* 1660. those who needed an Act of Indemnity did: And sometimes it is visible, that some men have had better times of gain and advantages then others, as the Clergy most eminently have had since his Majesties said Restauration. In all these Cases, the proposal of a Benevolence may be offered, although in no Cases it be without its inconveniences; the which are principally these.

1. The abovementioned Brow-beating and distaste given, if a man have not contributed as largely as envious observers think he should have done.

2. A Benevolence in many cases may divide a whole Nation into parties, or at least make the strength of Parties too well known to such as need not know it: and withall it may (on the contrary and upon design) disguize the same, and elude the measures which the Governours thought to have taken by such an exploratory artifice.

3. Some men may have particular reasons to contribute large, *viz*, complacency with, and hopes of being repaired by the favour of some Grandee, who favours the business, and the very same may make to the prejudice of others.

4. Men of sinking Estates, (who nevertheless love to live high, and appear splendid, and such who make themselves friends, (by their hospitality paid for, in effect by others) enough to be protected, even from Justice) do often upon this occasion of Benevolence set extravagant examples unto others, who have laboured hardly for what they have; those not caring what they pay, because it encreaseth their credit, to borrow the more, so as at length the whole burthen of such Bankrupts Benevolence, lights upon the frugal Patriots, by whom the Publick Weal subsists.

CHAP. X.

Of Penalties.

THe usual Penalties are Death, Mutilations, Imprisonment, publick Disgrace, Corporal transient pains, and great Tortures,

Tortures, beſides Pecuniary Mulcts. On which laſt we ſhall moſt inſiſt, ſpeaking of the others but in order to examine whether they may not be commuted for theſe.

2. There be ſome certain Crimes, for which the Law of God appoints death; and theſe muſt be puniſhed with it, unleſs we ſay that thoſe were but the Civil Laws of the Jewiſh Commonwealth, although given by God himſelf; of which opinion certainly moſt modern States are, in as much as they puniſh not Adulteries, &c. with death, as among the Jews, and yet puniſh ſmall Theſts with Death inſtead of multiple reparation.

3. Upon this ſuppoſition we ſhall venture to offer; whether the reaſon of ſimple Death be not to puniſh incorrigible Committers of great faults?

4. Of publick Death with Torments, to affright men from Treaſons, which cauſe the deaths and miſeries of many thouſand innocent and uſeful people?

5. Of Death ſecretly executed, to puniſh ſecret and unknown Crimes, ſuch as publick Executions would teach to the World? Or elſe to ſuffocate betimes ſome dangerous Novelties in Religion; which the patient ſuffering of the worſt man would much ſpread and encourage.

6. Mutilations ſuppoſe of ears, Noſe, &c. are uſed for perpetual diſgrace, as ſtanding in the Pillory is for temporary and tranſient; which and ſuch other puniſhments have (by the way) made ſome corrigible offenders, to become deſperate and incurable.

7. Mutilations of parts as of fingers, are proper to diſable ſuch as have abuſed their dextrous uſe of them by Pocket-picking, Counterfeiting of Seals and Writings, &c. Mutilations of other parts, may ſerve to puniſh and prevent Adulteries, Rapes, Inceſts, &c. And the ſmaller corporal pains, ſerve to puniſh thoſe, who can pay no pecuniary mulcts.

8. Impriſonment ſeems rather to be the puniſhments of ſuſpected then guilty perſons, and ſuch as by their carriage give the Magiſtrate occaſion to think, either they have done ſome ſmaller particular Crime, as Theſts, &c. or that they would commit greater, as Treaſons and ſeditions. But where Impriſonment is not a ſecuring men until their Trials, but

But a ſentence after Trial, it ſeems to me proper onely to ſeclude ſuch men from converſation, whoſe Diſcourſes are bewitching, and Practices infectious, and in whom nevertheleſs remains ſome hopes of their future Amendments, or uſefulneſs for ſome ſervice not yet appearing.

9. As for perpetual Impriſonment by ſentence, it ſeems but the ſame with death it ſelf, to be executed by nature it ſelf, quickned with ſuch Diſeaſes, as cloſe living, ſadneſs, ſolitude, and reflections upon a paſt and better condition, doth commonly beget: Nor do men ſentenced hereunto live longer, though they be longer in dying.

10. Here we are to remember in conſequence of our opinion, [That labour is the Father and active principle of Wealth, as Lands are the Mother] that the State by killing, mutilating, or impriſoning their members, do withal puniſh themſelves; wherefore ſuch puniſhments ought (as much as poſſible) to be avoided and commuted for pecuniary mulcts, which will encreaſe labour and publick Wealth.

11. Upon which account, why ſhould not a man of Eſtate, found guilty of man-ſlaughter, rather pay a certain proportion of his whole Eſtate, then be burnt in the hand?

12. VVhy ſhould not inſolvent Thieves be rather puniſhed with ſlavery then death? ſo as being ſlaves they may be forced to as much labour, and as cheap fare, as nature will endure, and thereby become as two men added to the Common-wealth, and not as one taken away from it, for if *England* be underpeopled, (ſuppoſe by half) I ſay that next to the bringing in of as many more as now are, is the making theſe that are, to do double the work which now they do; that is, to make ſome ſlaves; but of this elſewhere.

13. And why ſhould not the ſolvent Thieves and Cheats be rather puniſhed with multiple Reſtitutions then Death, Pillory, VVhipping, &c. but it will be asked with how manifold Reſtitutions ſhould picking a pocket (for example) be puniſhed? I ſay 'twere good in order to the ſolution hereof, to enquire of ſome candid Artiſts in that Trade, how often they are taken one time with another practiſing in this work? If but once in ten times: then to reſtore even but ſeven-fold,

would

would be a fair profit; and to restore but ten-fold, were but an even lay; wherefore to restore twenty-fold, that is, double to the hazard, is rather the true *ratio* and measure of punishment by double reparation.

14. And surely the restoring two, three, four, and seven-fold mentioned in *Moses* Law must be thus understood, or else a man might mak thieving a very fair and lawful profession.

15. The next question is, in such multiple Restitutions how many parts should be given to the sufferer. To which I answer, never above one, and scarce that, to oblige him to more care, and self-preservation, with three parts to discoverers, and the rest to publick uses.

16. Thirdly, In the case of Fornications, most of the punishments not made by pecuniary-mulcts and commuted, are but shame, and that too but towards some few persons, which shame for ever after obdurates the Offender, what ever it work upon such whose fames are yet intire: Of all which men take little consideration, standing upon the brink of such precipices as makes them giddy; and when they are in danger of such faults as are rather madnesses, distempers, and alienations of the mind and reason, as also insurrections of the passions, then deliberate acts of the understanding.

17. Moreover, according to that Axiom of, *In quo quis peccat, in eodem puniatur*; if the *Ratio formalis* of the sin of *Concubitus Vagi*, be the hindering of procreation, let those who by their miscarriages of this kind are guilty thereof, repair unto the State the miss of another pair of hands with the double labour of their own, or which is all one, by a pecuniary mulct; and this is the practice of some wise States in punishing what they will never be able to prevent: Nor doth the Gospel specifie any punishment in this world, onely declaring they shall not be received into the joys of the next.

18. I could instance in more particulars, but if what I have already said be reasonable, this little is enough; if not, then all the rest would be too little also: wherefore I shall add but one instance more, as most suitable to our present times and occasions, which is the way of punishing Heterodox Professors of Religion.

19. That

19. That the Magistrate [illegible] punish false Believers, if he believe he shall offend God in forbearing it, is true; for the same reasons that men give for Liberty of Conscience, and universal tolleration; and on the other side, that he may permit false Worships, seems clearly at least by the practice of all States, who allow Ambassadours their freedom (be their Worship never so abominable) even when they come to negotiate but upon temporal and small matters.

20. Wherefore, since the Magistrate may allow or connive at such Worships as himself thinks fit, and yet may also punish; and since by Death, Mutilations and imprisonments of the Subjects, the State not onely punisheth it self, but spreadeth the Pseudodoxies; it follows, that pecuniary Mulcts are the fittest ways of checking the wantonness of men in this particular: forasmuch as that course favours of no bitterness at all, but rather argues a desire to indulge, provided such indulgence may consist with the indempnity of the State; for no Heterodox Believer will desire to be tollerated longer then he keeps the Publick Peace; the which if he means to do, he cannot take it ill of the Magistrate, to keep him steddy unto that his duty, nor grudge to contribute towards so much charge for that purpose as himself occasions.

21. Moreover, as there seems a reason for indulging some conscientious misbelievers, so there is as much for being severe towards Hypocrites, especially such as abuse holy Religion to cloak and vizzard worldly ends: Now what more easie and yet effectual way is there to discern between these two, then well proportioned pecuniary mulcts? for who desiring to serve God without fear, and labouring ten hours *per diem* at his Calling, would not labour one hour more for such a freedom? even as Religious men spend an hour *per diem* more then the looser sort at their Devotions; or who wearing Cloth of one and twenty shillings the yard, would not be contented with that of twenty shillings, for the same advantage of his liberty in Worship? Those that kick at this being unwilling either to do or suffer for God, for whose sake they pretend so much.

22. It may be here objected, that although some bad Reli-

gions might be tollerated, yet that all may not, *viz.* such as consist not with the Civil Peace. To which I answer.

First, that there is no Schism or Separation be it never so small, consistent with that unity and peace as could be wisht; nor none so perfectly conscientious, but may also be civilly most pernicious: For that *Venner* and his Complices acted upon internal motives, the most free exposing of themselves to death may evince; and yet their holding the King to be an Usurper upon the Throne and Right of Jesus Christ was a Civil mischief neither to be pardoned or parallel'd.

28. And yet on the other hand there is no Pseudodoxy so great, but may be muzled from doing much harm in the State, without either Death, Imprisonment, or Mutilation: To make short, no opinion can be more dangerous, then to disbelieve the immortality of the Soul, as rendring man a beast, and without conscience, or fear of committing any evil, if he can but elude the penalties of humane Laws made against it, and letting men loose to all evil thoughts and designs whereof man can take no notice: Now I say, that even this Misbeliever may be adæquately punished if he be kept as a beast, be proprietor of nothing, as making no conscience how he gets; be never admitted in Evidence or Testimony, as under no Obligation to speak truth; be excluded all Honours and Offices, as caring onely for himself, not the protecting of others; and be withal kept to extream bodily labour, the profit whereof to the State is the pecuniary Mulct we speak of, though the greatest.

24. As for opinions less horrible then this, the Mulct may be fitted to each of them respectively, according to the measure of danger which the Magistrate apprehends from their allowance, and the charge necessary to prevent it.

25. And now we are speaking of the ways how to prevent and correct Heterodoxies in Religion, which we have hitherto done by designing punishments for the erring sheep, I think it not amiss to add, That in all these cases the Shepherds themselves should not wholly scape free: For if in this Nation there be such abundance of Free-Schools, and of liberal Maintenance provided in our Universities and elsewhere for instruct-

inſtructing more then enough in all ſuch learning as is fit to defend the eſtabliſhed Religion, together with ſuperabundant Libraries for that purpoſe. Moreover, if the Church-preferments be ſo numerous and ample both for Wealth, Honour, and Power, as ſcarce any where more; it ſeems ſtrange that when by the lazineſs, formality, ignorance, and looſe lives of our Paſtours, the ſheep have gone aſtray, grown ſcabbed, or have been devoured by Wolves and Foxes, that the Remedy of all this ſhould be onely ſought by frighting thoſe that have ſtrayed from ever returning again, and by tearing off as well the skins as the wooll of thoſe that are ſcabbed; whereas Almighty God will rather require the blood even of them that have been devoured, from the Shepherds themſelves.

26. Wherefore if the Miniſter ſhould loſe part of the Tythes of thoſe whom he ſuffers to defect from the Church, (the defector not ſaving, but the State wholly gaining them) and the defector paying ſome pecuniary Mulct for his Schiſm, and withall himſelf defraying the charge of his new particular Church and Paſtorage, methinks the burthen would be thus more equally born.

27. Beſides, the judicious world do not believe our Clergy can deſerve the vaſt preferments they have, onely becauſe they preach, give a better accompt of Opinions concerning Religion then others, or can expreſs their conceptions in the words of the Fathers, or the Scriptures, &c. Whereas certainly the great honour we give them, is for being patterns of Holineſs, for ſhewing by their own ſelf-denials, mortifications, and auſterities, that 'tis poſſible for us to imitate them in the precepts of God; for if it were but for their bare Pulpit-diſcourſes, ſome men might think there is ten thouſand times as much already printed as can be neceſſary, and as good as any that ever hereafter may be expected. And it is much ſuſpected, that the Diſcipline of the Cloiſters hath kept up the Roman Religion, which the Luxury of the Cardinals and Prelates might have deſtroyed.

28. The ſubſtance therefore of all we have ſaid in this diſcourſe concerning the Church is, that it would make much for its peace, if the Nurſery of Miniſters be not too big, that

Auſterities in the Prieſts lives would reconcile them to the people; and that it is not unreaſonable, that when the whole Church ſuffers by the defection of her Members, that the Paſtors of it by bearing a ſmall part ſhould be made ſenſible of the loſs; the manner and meaſures of all which I leave unto thoſe unto whom it belongs.

29. Concerning Penalties and Penal Laws I ſhall add but this, that the abuſe of them is, when they are made not to keep men from ſin, but to draw them into puniſhment; and when the Executors of them keep them hid until a fault be done, and then ſhew them terrible to the poor immalicious offender: Juſt like Centinels, who never ſhew men the advertiſements againſt piſſing near their Guards, till they have catcht them by the coats for the forfeiture they claim.

CHAP. XI.

Of Monopolies and Offices.

MOnopoly (as the word ſignifies) is the ſole ſelling power, which whoſoever hath, can vend the commodity whereupon he hath this power, either qualified as himſelf pleaſes, or at what price he pleaſeth, or both, within the limits of his Commiſſion.

2 The great example of a Monopoly is the King of *France* his Gabel upon Salt, wherby he ſells that for ſixty which coſts him but one; now Salt being a thing of Univerſal uſe to all degrees of men, and ſcarce more to the poor then the rich, it ſeems to be of the ſame effect with the ſimpleſt Poll-money abovementioned, in caſe all men ſpent equally of it, or if men be forced to take it whether they ſpend it or not, as in ſome places they are. But if men ſpend or eat Salt unequally, as they commonly do, nor are bound to take or pay for more then they ſpend, then it is no other then an accumulative Excize, eſpecially if the Salt be all of one Uniform goodneſs; otherwiſe it is a diſtinct ſpecies of Leavy, *viz.* a Monopoly.

3. The

2. The uſe or Pretence of inſtituting a Monopoly is,

Firſt, Right of Invention; foraſmuch as the Laws do reward Inventions, by granting them a Monopoly of them for a certain time; (as here in *England* for fourteen years) for thereby the Inventor is rewarded more or leſs according to the acceptance which his Invention finds amongſt men.

Where note by the way, that few new Inventions were ever rewarded by a Monopoly; for although the Inventor oftentimes drunk with the opinion of his own merit, thinks all the world will invade and incroach upon him, yet I have obſerved, that the generality of men will ſcarce be hired to make uſe of new practices, which themſelves have not throughly tried, and which length of time hath not vindicated from latent inconveniences; ſo as when a new Invention is firſt propounded, in the beginning every man objects, and the poor Inventor runs the Gantloop of all petulent wits; every man finding his ſeveral flaw, no man approving it, unleſs mended according to his own advice: Now not one of an hundred out-lives this torture, and thoſe that do, are at length ſo changed by the various contrivances of others, that not any one man can pretend to the Invention of the whole, nor well agree about their reſpective ſhares in the parts. And moreover, this commonly is ſo long a doing, that the poor Inventor is either dead, or diſabled by the debts contracted to purſue his deſign; and withal railed upon as a Projector, or worſe, by thoſe who joyned their money in partnerſhip with his wit; ſo as the ſaid Inventor and his pretences are wholly loſt and vaniſht.

Secondly, a Monopoly may be of real uſe for a time, *viz.* at the firſt introducing of a new Manufacture, wherein is much nicety to make it well, and which the generality of men cannot judge of as to the performance. As for example; ſuppoſe there were ſome moſt approved Medicament which one certain man could make moſt exactly well, although ſeveral others could alſo make the ſame leſs perfectly: in this caſe this ſame chief Artiſt may be allowed a Monopoly for a time, *viz.* until others have had experience enough under him, how to make the Medicament as well as himſelf. Firſt, becauſe the

world

world may not have the Medicament variouſly made, when as they can neither diſcern the difference by their ſenſes, nor judge of the effects thereof *à poſteriori*, by their reaſons. Secondly, becauſe others may be fully inſtructed by him that can beſt do it; and thirdly, becauſe he may have a reward for ſuch his communications: But foraſmuch as by Monopolies of this kind, great Levies are ſeldom made, they are ſcarce pertinent to our deſign.

Offices inſtituted by the State with Fees of their own appointment, are of parallel nature to Monopolies; the one relating to actions and employments as the other to things, and have the ſame to be ſaid for and againſt them as Monopolies have.

As a Kingdom encreaſeth and flouriſheth, ſo doth variety of things, of actions, and even of words encreaſe alſo; for we ſee that the language of the moſt flouriſhing Empires was ever the moſt copious and elegant, and that of mountainous Cantons the contrary: Now as the actions of this Kingdom encreaſed, ſo did the Offices (that is, the power and faculty of ſolely executing and performing the ſaid actions) encreaſe likewiſe; and on the contrary, as the buſineſs of Offices encreaſed, ſo did the difficulty and danger of diſcharging them amiſs decreaſe proportionably: from whence 'tis come to paſs, that the Offices which at their firſt erecting were not performed but by the ableſt, moſt inventive, and verſatile Inſtruments, (ſuch as could wreſtle with all emergent difficulties, and collect Rules and Axioms out of the Series of their own Obſervations, (with reference to the various caſualties of their employments) whereby to direct Poſterity) are now performed by the moſt ordinary, formal, pack-horſe Deputies and Sub-Deputies.

And whereas at firſt ſuch large Fees were allowed as (conſidering even the paucity of them which might then be received) ſhould compenſate the Art, Truſt, and Induſtry of the Adminiſtrator; yet the ſaid large Fees are ſtill continued, although the skill and truſt be leſſened, and the number of the ſaid Fees ſo extreamly multiplied: ſo as now the profits of ſuch Offices (being become cleer, and the work ſo eaſie as any man is capable of it, even thoſe that never ſaw it,) are

are bought and ſold for Years or Lives, as any other Annuity may be; and withal, the ſplendor ariſing from the eaſie gains of thoſe places in Courts of Juſtice, is called the Flouriſhing of the Law, which certainly flouriſheth beſt, when the Profeſſors and Miniſters of it have leaſt to do. And moreover, when the burthen and uſeleſneſs of ſuch an Office is taken notice of, 'tis nevertheleſs ſpared as a Subjects Freehold in Favour of him that bought it.

Of theſe Offices are many in this Nation, and ſuch as might be a Revenue to the King, either by their Annual profits, or the Sale of them for many years together. And theſe are the Offices that are properly Saleable, *viz.* where the Fees are large, as appointed when the number of them was few, and alſo numerous, as multiplying upon the encreaſe of buſineſs, and where the buſineſs is onely the labour of the meaneſt men: length of time having made all the work ſo eaſie, and found out ſecurity againſt all the frauds, breaches of truſt, and maleadminiſtrations, whereunto the infancies of thoſe places were obnoxious.

Theſe Offices are therefore Taxes upon ſuch as can or will not avoid the paſſing through them, and are born as men endure and run themſelves into the miſchiefs of Duelling, the which are very great, which ſide ſoever prevails; for certainly men do not always go to Law to obtain right, or prevent wrong, which judicious neighbours might perform as well as a Jury of no abler men; and men might tell the Judge himſelf the merits of their Cauſe, as well as now they inſtruct their Council. This therefore of Offices is a voluntary Tax upon contentious men, as Excize upon Drink is to good Fellows to love it.

CHAP. XII.

Of Tythes.

THe word Tythes, being the ſame with Tenths, ſignifie of it ſelf no more then the proportion of the *Exciſium*, or

or part retrenched, as if Customs upon imported and exported Commodities should be called by the name of Twentieths, as it is sometimes called Tunnage and Poundage; wherefore it remains to say, that Tythes in this place, do together with the said proportion, consignifie the use of it, *viz.* the maintenance of the Clergy, as also the matter or substance out of which this Maintenance is cut, *viz.* the immediate fruit of the Land and Waters, or the proceed of mens Labour, Art, and Stock laid out upon them. It signifies also the manner of paying it, *viz.* in *specie*, and not (but upon special and voluntary causes) in money.

2. We said the matter of Tythes was the immediate Fruits of the Earth, *viz.* of Grain as soon as 'tis ready to be removed from the ground that bare it; and not of Bread which is Corn thresht, winnowed, ground, tempered with liquor and baked.

3. 'Tis also the second choice out of the young of multiparous Cattle taken in *specie*, so soon as the said Younglings can subsist without their Dams, or else a Composition in Money for the Uniparons.

4. 'Tis Wooll, so soon as it is shorn; 'tis Fowl and Fish, where Fowling and Fishing is rather a Trade then a meer Recreation, *& sic de cæteris*.

5. Moreover, in great Cities, Tythes are a kind of composition in Money for the labour and profit of the Artisans who work upon the materials which have paid Tythes before.

6. Tythes therefore encrease within any Territory, as the labour of that Countrey increases; and labour doth or ought to increase as the people do; now within four hundred years the people of *England* are about quadrupled, as doubling every two hundred years, and the proportion of the Rent of all the Lands in *England* is about the fourth part of the Expence of the people in it, so as the other three parts is labour and stock.

7. Wherefore the Tythes now should be twelve times as good as they were four hundred years ago; which the rates of Benefices in the Kings books do pretty well shew, by comparing of times; something of this should be abated because the proportion between the proceed of Lands and Labour do vary as the hands of Labourers vary: Wherefore we shall rather say,

ſay, that the Tythes are but ſix times as good now as four hundred years ago, that is, that the Tythes now would pay ſix times as many Labourers, or feed ſix times as many mouths, as the Tythes four hundred years ago would have done.

8. Now if there were not onely as many Pariſhes then as now, more Prieſts in every Pariſh, and alſo more Religious Men who were alſo Prieſts, and the Religion of thoſe times being more operoſe, and fuller of work then now, by reaſon of Confeſſions, Holydaies, Offices, &c. more in thoſe daies then now, (the great work in theſe days being a compendious teaching of above a thouſand at once without much particular Confeſſion and Catechiſing, or trouble about the dead; it ſeems clear, that the Clergy now is far richer then heretofore; and that to be a Clergy-man then was a kind of a Mortification, whereas now (praiſed be God) 'tis matter of ſplendor and magnificence; unleſs any will ſay, that there were golden Prieſts when the Chalices were wood, and but wooden Prieſts when the Chalices were gold; or that Religion beſt flouriſheth when the Prieſts are moſt mortified, as was before ſaid of the Law, which beſt flouriſheth when Lawyers have leaſt to do.

9. But what ever the increaſe of the Churches Goods are, I grudge it them not; onely wiſh that they would take a courſe to enjoy it with ſafety and peace to themſelves; whereof one is, not to breed more Churchmen then the Benefices as they now ſtand ſhared out, will receive; that is to ſay, if there be places but for about twelve thouſand in *England* and *Wales*, it will not be ſafe to breed up 24000. Miniſters, upon a view or conceipt that the Church Means otherwiſe diſtributed might ſuffice them all; for then the twelve thouſand which are unprovided for, will ſeek ways how to get themſelves a livelihood; which they cannot do more eaſily then by perſwading the people, that the twelve thouſand Incumbents do poiſon or ſtarve their ſouls, and miſguide them in their way to Heaven: Which needy men upon a ſtrong temptation will do effectually; we having obſerved, that Lecturers being ſuch a ſort of Supernumeraries, have preached more times in a week, more hours in the day, and with greater vehemence every time then the Incumbents could afford to do; for *Gra-*

eulus eſuriens in Cœlum juſſerit, ibit. Now this vehemence, this pain, this zeal, and this living upon particular donations, makes the people think, that thoſe who act them are withal more Orthodox, nay better aſſiſted from God then the others. Now let any man judge, whether men reputed to be inſpired will not get help to lift themſelves into Church-livings, *&c.* But theſe things are too plain from the lateſt experiences.

10. Now you will ask, how ſhall that be done, or how may we know how to adjuſt our Nurſery to our Orchard? To which I anſwer, that if there be twelve thouſand Church-livings in *England*, Dignitaries included, then that about four hundred being ſent forth *per ann.* in the Vineyard, may keep it well ſerved, without luxuriency; for according to the Mortality-Bill-obſervation, about that number will dye yearly out of twelve thouſand Adult-perſons, ſuch as Miniſters are as to age, and ought to be as well as to ſpeculative knowledge, as practical experience, both of themſelves and others.

11. But I have digreſſed, my main ſcope being to explain the nature of the Tax of Tythes; nevertheleſs ſince the end of ſuch explanation is but to perſwade men to bear quietly ſo much Tax as is neceſſary, and not to kick againſt the pricks; and ſince the end of that again, and the end of all elſe we are to do, is but to preſerve the publick Peace, I think I have not been impertinent in inſerting this little Advertiſement, making ſo much for the Peace of *Jeruſalem*.

12. But to return to Tythes as a Tax or Levy, I ſay that in *England* it is none; whatſoever it might be or ſeem to be in the firſt Age of its Inſtitution; nor will the Kings Quit-rents in *Ireland* as they are properly none now, ſeem any in the next Age, when every man will proportion his Expence to the remainder of his own Rent after the King is paid his; for 'tis ſurprize and the ſuddenneſs of the Charge, which a Tax ſupervenient to a mans other expences and iſſues makes, that renders it a burthen, and that intollerable to ſuch as will not underſtand it, making men even to take up Arms to withſtand it; that is, leap out of the Frying-pan upon Earth into the Fire even of Hell, which is War and the conſequences thereof.

13. Now Tythes being no Tax, I ſpeak of it but as the

modus

modus or pattern of a Tax, affirming it to be next to one, the moſt equal and indifferent which can be appointed in order to defray the publick Charge of the whole Nation as well as that of the Church: for hereby is collected a proportion of all the Corn, Cattle, Fiſh, Fowl, Fruit, Wooll, Honey, Wax, Oyl, Hemp, and Flax of the Nation, as a reſult of the Lands, Art, Labour and Stock which produced them; onely it is ſcarce regular in reſpect of Houſing Cloth, Drinks, Leather, Feathers, and the ſeveral Manufactures of them; inſomuch, as if the difference of Tythes which the Countrey pays in proportion to the City, were now *de novo* to be eſtabliſhed, I do not ſee what in likelihood would ſooner cauſe a grand ſedition about it.

14. The payment of an *aliquot* part to the King out of the ſame things as now pay Tythes, *in ſpecie*, would have an inconvenience, becauſe the Kings Rents would be like the Dividend in Colledges, *viz.* higher or lower according to the prices of thoſe Commodities, unleſs the ſaid inequality in Colledges happen by reaſon of the fewneſs of particulars, according to the market rates whereof, their Rents are paid in money; whereas the whole of all the particulars might well enough ballance each other, a dear or plentiful year being but an appellation *ſecundum quid*, *viz.* with reference as to Corn onely, as the chief food of the multitude; whereas 'tis likely, that the ſame cauſes which makes Corn ſcarce may make other things in plenty of no leſs uſe to the King, as repairing in one thing what he wants in another.

15. Another inconvenience would be that which was obſerved in *Ireland*, when the Miniſtery were paid by Sallary, and the Tythes in kind paid to the State; who becauſe they could not actually receive them *in ſpecie*, let them at farm to the moſt bidder; in the Tranſaction whereof was much jugling, combination and colluſion, which perhaps might have been remedied, had not that courſe been uſed but as a ſudden temporary ſhift, without intention of continuing it.

16. The third inconvenience is, that abovementioned, viz. the neceſſity of another way of Tax, to take in the Manufactures of thoſe Commodities which pay the Tax of Tythes;

whereas possibly there is a way of Tax equal in its own nature, and which needs not to be pieced up by any other; so as the Officers about that may have a full employment, and none others wanted, whose wide intervals of leasure shall make them seem Drones, as they are also the Caterpillers of any State.

CHAP. XIII.

Of several smaller ways of levying Money.

WHen the people are weary of any one sort of Tax, presently some Projector propounds another, and gets himself Audience, by affirming he can propound a way how all the publick charge may be born without the way that is. As for example, if a Land-tax be the present distasted way, and the people weary of it, then he offers to do the business without such a Land-tax, and propound either a Poll-money, Excize, or the institution of some new Office or Monopoly; and hereby draws some or other to hearken to him; which is readily enough done by those who are not in the places of profit relating to the way of Levies in use, but hope to make themselves Offices in the new Institution.

2. I shall enumerate a few of the smaller ways which I have observed in several places of *Europe*, *viz.*

First, in some places the State is common Cashier for all or most moneys, as where Banks are, thereby gaining the interest of as much money as is deposited in their hands.

Secondly, Sometimes the State is the common Usurer, as where Loan Banks, and *montes pietatis* are in use, and might be more copiously and effectually where Registers of Lands are kept.

Thirdly, Sometimes the State is or may be Common Ensurer, either upon the danger onely of Enemies at sea, according to the supposed primitive end of our Customs in *England*, or else of the casualties of the Enemy, Weather, Sea, and Vessel taken together.

Fourthly, Sometimes the State hath the whole Sale and benefit

benefit of certain Commodities, as of Amber in the Duke of *Brandenburghs* Countrey, Tobacco formerly in *Ireland*, Salt in *France*, &c.

Fifthly, Sometimes the State is common Beggar, as 'tis almost in *Holland*, where particular Charity seems onely to serve for the relief of concealed wants, and to save these wanting from the shame of discovering their poverty, and not so much to relieve any wants that are declared, and already publickly known.

Sixthly, In some places the State is the sole Guardian of Minors, Lunaticks, and Idiots.

Seventhly, In some other Countreys the State sets up and maintains Play-houses, and Publick Entertainments, giving Sallaries to the Actors, but receiving the bulk of the profit to themselves.

Eighthly, In some places, Houses are ensured from fire by the State at a small Rent *per annum* upon each.

Ninthly, In some places Tolls are taken upon passage over Bridges, Causeys, and Ferries built and maintained at the Publick Charge.

Tenthly, In some places men that dye are obliged to leave a certain pittance to the publick, the same is practised in other places upon Marriages, and may be in others upon Births.

Eleventhly, In some places strangers, especially *Jews*, are particularly taxed; which may be good in over-peopled Countries, though bad in the contrary case.

3. As for *Jews*, they may well bear somewhat extraordinary, because they seldom eat and drink with Christians, hold it no disparagement to live frugally, and even sordidly among themselves, by which way alone they become able to under-sell any other Traders, to elude the Excize, which bears but according to men Expences; as also other Duties by dealing so much in Bills of Exchange, Jewels and Money, and by practising of several frauds with more impunity then others; but by their being at home every where, and yet no where they become responsible almost for nothing.

4. Twelfthly, There have been in our times, ways of levying an *aliquot* part of mens Estates, as a Fifth, and Twentieth,

viz.

viz. of their Estates real and personal, yea, of their Offices, Faculties, and imaginary Estates also, in and about which way may be so much fraud, collusion, oppression, and trouble, some purposely getting themselves taxed to gain more trust: Others bribing to be taxed low, and it being impossible to check or examine, or trace these Collections by the print of any foot-steps they leave, (such as the Hearths of Chimneys are) that I have not patience to speak more against it; daring rather conclude without more ado, in the words of our Comick to be naught, yea exceeding naught, very abominable, and not good.

CHAP. XIV.

Of raising, depressing, or embasing of Money.

SOmetimes it hath happened, that States (I know not by what raw advice) have raised or embased their money, hoping thereby, as it were, to multiply it, and make it pass for more then it did before; that is, to purchase more commodity or labour with it: All which indeed and in truth, amounts to no more then a Tax, upon such People unto whom the State is indebted, or a defalkation of what is due; as also the like burthen upon all that live upon Pensions, established Rents, Annuities, Fees, Gratuities, *&c.*

2. To explain this fully, one might lanch out into the deep Ocean of all the Mysteries concerning Money, which is done for other ends elsewhere: nevertheless I shall do it the best I can, by expounding the reasons *pro & contrà* for embasing and raising of Money: and first of embasing.

3. Copper or Tin-money made *ad valorem* in its matter, is no embasing; the same being onely cumbersom and baser then silver money, onely because less convenient and portable.

And Copper money *ad valorem* in workmanship and matter both together; (such as on which the Effigies and Scutcheon are so curiously graven and impressed, as the moneys seem rather Medals) is not embasing, unless the numbers of such pieces be excessive, (the measures whereof I shall not set down

down, until I ſhall hereafter propound the fitteſt Sections of the abſtracted pound into which I would have Money coined, and determine how may pieces of each Section ſhould be in an hundred pound) for in caſe of ſuch exceſs, the workmanſhip being of no other uſe but to look upon, becomes baſe by its being too common.

4. Nor are ſuch Tokens baſe as are coyned for Exchange in retailing by particular men, (if ſuch men be reſponſible and able to take them back, and give Silver for them.)

5. But that Gold I count to be embaſed, which hath more allay either of Copper or Silver in it, then ſerves to correct its too great natual ſoftneſs and flexibility, whereby it wears too faſt in Money: And that Silver I reckon alſo embaſed, wherein is commixed more Copper then will ſufficiently toughen it, and ſave it from cracking under the hammer, Preſs, or Mill that muſt coyn it, or the like.

6. Baſe Money is therefore ſuch as *Dutch* ſhillings, Stivers, *French* Soulz, *Iriſh* Bon-galls, *&c.* and for the moſt part conſiſting of great pieces, though of ſmall value. To anſwer the firſt reaſon or pretence of making them, which is, that the ſaid Pieces might be more bulky, handleable, and the ſilver in them leſs apt to be loſt or worn away.

7. The other reaſon (beſides that of allay which we muſt allow in the meaſures abovementioned) is to ſave it from being melted down by Goldſmiths and Bullioners, or exported by ſtrangers; neither of which can happen but to their loſs: for ſuppoſe a Stiver of two pence, had a penny of pure ſilver, if the Bullioner melts it for the ſake of the ſilver onely, in the ſeparation he ſhall loſe the Copper and charge of refining the ſilver; nor will the ſtrangers export it into places where the local value of the piece periſheth, the intrinſick leaving him to loſs.

7. Now the reaſons againſt this kind of Money are, firſt, the greater danger of falſification, becauſe the colour, ſound, and weight by which men (without the teſt) gueſs at the goodneſs of the material of Money is too much confounded, for the vulgar (whom it concerns) to make uſe of them for their marks and guides in the buſineſs.

8. Secondly,

8. Secondly, In case small pieces of this Money, *viz.* pieces of two pence should happen to be raised or depressed twelve, fifteen, or sixteen *per cent.* then there will be a certain loss by reason of the fractions, which the vulgar cannot reckon: As for example, if such Money were depressed but ten, eleven, or twelve *per cent.* then the two pence piece would be worth but three half pence, which is twenty five *per cent.* and so of other proportions.

9. Thirdly, In case the inconvenience of this Money should be so great as to necessitate a new Coinage of it, then will happen all the losses we mentioned before in melting it down by Bullioners.

10. Fourthly, If the two pence piece contained but $\frac{1}{15}$th part of the Silver usually in a shilling, then Dealers would have fifteen pence paid in this money for the same Commodity, for which they would take a shilling in Standard Silver.

11. Raising of Money is either the cutting the pound *Troy* of Standard Silver into more pieces then formerly, as into above sixty, whereas heretofore the same was made but into twenty, and yet both sorts called shillings, or else calling the money already made by higher names: The reasons or pretences given for such raising are these, *viz.* That the raising of Money will bring it in, and the material thereof more plentifully; for trial whereof, suppose one shilling were proclaimed to be worth two, what other effect could this have, then the raising of all Commodities unto a double price? Now if it were proclaimed, That Labourers Wages, *&c.* should not rise at all upon this raising of Money, then would this Act be as onely a Tax upon the said Labourers, as forcing them to lose half their wages, which would not be onely unjust, but impossible, unless they could live with the said half, (which is not to be supposed) for then the Law that appoints such Wages were ill made, which should allow the Labourer but just wherewithal to live; for if you allow double, then he works but half so much as he could have done, and otherwise would; which is a loss to the Publick of the fruit of so much labour.

12. But suppose the *Quart d' Escu* of *France* commonly esteemed worth eighteen pence, were raised to three shillings,

then

then 'tis true, that all the Moneys of *England* would be indeed *Quart d' Escu* pieces; but as true, that all the English Money would be carried away, and that our *Quart d' Escu* would contain but half so much Bullion as our own money did; so that raising of money may indeed change the *species*, but with so much loss as the Forreign Pieces were raised unto, above their intrinsick value.

13. But for remedy of this, suppose we raised the *Quart d' Escu* double, and prohibited the Exportation of our own money in Exchange thereof. I answer, that such a Prohibition is nugatory, and impossible to be executed; and if it were not, yet the raising of the said *species* would but make us sell the Commodities bought with raised *Quart d' Escues*, in effect but at half the usual rate, which unto them that want such commodities will as well yield the full; so that abating our prices, will as well allure strangers to buy extraordinary proportions of our Commodities, as raising their money will do: But neither that, nor abating the price will make strangers use more of our Commodities, then they want; for although the first year they should carry away an unuseful and superfluous proportion, yet afterwards they would take so much the less.

14. If this be true, as in substance it is, why then have so many wise States in several ancient, as well as modern times frequently practised this Artifice as a means to draw in money into their respective Dominions?

I answer, that something is to be attributed to the stupidity and ignorance of the people, who cannot of a sudden understand this matter: for I finde many men wise enough, who though they be well informed that raising of money signifies little, yet cannot suddenly digest it. As for example, an unengaged person who had money in his purse in *England*, and should hear that a shilling was made fourteen pence in *Ireland*, would more readily run thither to buy Land then before; not suddenly apprehending, that for the same Land which he might have bought before for six years Purchase, he shall now pay seven. Nor will Sellers in *Ireland* of a sudden apprehend cause to raise their Land proportionally, but will at least be contented to compound the business, viz. to sell at six and an

halfe; and if the difference be a more ragged fraction, men under a long time will not apprehend it, nor ever be able exactly to govern their practice according to it.

15. Secondly, Although I apprehend little real defference between raising Forreign Money to double, and abating half in the price of our own Commodities, yet to sell them on on a tacite condition to be paid in Forreign present Money, shall increase our money; forasmuch as between raising the money, and abasing the price, is the same difference as between selling for money and in barter, which latter is the dearer; or between selling for present money, and for time; barter resolving into the nature of uncertain time.

16. I say, suppose English Cloth were sold at six shillings a Yard, and French Canvas at eighteen pence the Ell, the question is, whether it were all one in order to increase Money in *England* to raise the French Money double, or to abate half of the price of our Cloth? I think the former better, because that former way or proposition carries with it a a condition of having Forreign Money *in specie*, and not Canvas in barter, between which two wayes the world generally agrees there is a difference. Wherefore if we can afford to abate halfe our price, but will not do it but for our neighbours money, then we gain so much as the said difference between Money and Barter amounts unto, by such raising of our Neighbours Money.

17. But the fundamental solution of this Question depends upon a real and not an imaginary way of computing the prices of Commodities; in order to which real way I premise these suppositions: First then, suppose there be in a Territory a thousand people, let these people be supposed sufficient to Till this whole Territory as to the Husbandry of Corn, which we will suppose to contain all neccessaries for life, as in the Lords Prayer we suppose the word Bread doth; and let the production of a Bushel of this Corn be supposed of equal labour to that of producing an ounce of Silver. Suppose again that a tenth part of this Land and tenth of the people viz. an hundred of them can produce Corn enough for the whole; suppose that the Rent of Land (found out as abbove-

mentioned)

mentioned) be a fourth part of the whole product, (about which proportion it really is, as we may perceive by paying a fourth Sheaf instead of Rent in some places) suppose also that whereas but an hundred are necessary for this Husbandry, yet that two hundred have taken up the Trade; and suppose that where a Bushel of Corn would suffice, yet each out of delicacy will use two, making use of the Flower onely of both. Now the inferences from hence are;

First, That the goodness or badness, or the value of Land depends upon the greater or lesser share of the product given for it in proportion to the simple labour bestowed to raise the said Product.

Secondly, That the proportions between Corn and Silver signifie onely an artificial value, not a natural; because the comparison is between a thing naturally useful, and a thing in it selfe unnecessary, which (by the way) is part of the reason why there are not so great changes and leaps in the prizes of Silver as of other Commodities.

Thirdly, That natural dearness and cheapness depends upon the few or more hands requisite to necessaries of Nature: As Corn is cheaper where one man produces Corn for ten, then where he can do the like but for six; and withall, according as the Climate disposes men to a necessity of spending more or less. But Political Cheapness depends upon the paucity of Supernumerary Interlopers into any Trade over and above all that are necessary, viz. Corn will be twice as dear where any two hundred Husbandmen to do the same work which an hundred could perform: the proportion thereof being compounded with the proportion of superfluous Expence, (viz. if to the cause of dearness abovementioned be added to the double Expence to what is necessary) then the natural price will appear quadrupled, and this quadruple Price is the true Political Price compared upon natural grounds.

And this again proportioned to the common artificial Standard Silver gives what was sought, that is, the true price Current.

18. But forasmuch as almost all Commodities have their Substitutes or Succedanea, and that almost all uses may be

answered several ways; and for that novelty, surprize, example of Superiours, and opinion of unexaminable effects do adde or take away from the price of things, we must adde these contingent Causes to the permanent Causes abovementioned, in the judicious foresight and computation whereof lies the excellency of a Merchant.

10 Now to apply this Degression, I say, that to encrease Money, it is as well necessary to know how to abate as raise, the price of commodities, and that of Money, which was the scope of the said Digression.

19. To conclude this whole Chapter, we say, that raising or embasing of Moneys is a very pittyful and unequal way of Taxing the people, and 'tis a sign that the State sinketh, which catcheth hold on such Weeds as are accompanied with the dishonour of impressing a Princes Effigies to justifie Adulterate Commodities, and the breach of Publick Faith, such as is the calling a thing what it really is not.

CHAP. XV.

Of Excize.

IT is generally allowed by all, that men should contribute to the Publick Charge but according to the share and interest they have in the Publick Peace; that is, according to their Estates or Riches: now there are two sorts of Riches, one actual, and the other potential. A man is actually and truly rich according to what he eateth, drinketh, weareth, or any other way really and actually enjoyeth; others are but potentially or imaginatively rich, who though they have power overmuch, make little use of it; these being rather Stewards and Exchangers for the other sort, then owners for themselves.

2. Concluding therefore that every man ought to contribute according to what he taketh to himself, and actually enjoyeth. The first thing to be done is, to compute what the Total of the Expence of this Nation is by particular men upon

on them ſelves, and then what part thereof is neceſſary for the Publick; both which (no not the former) are ſo difficult as moſt men imagine.

3. In the next place we muſt conceive, that the very perfect Idea of making a Leavy upon Conſumptions, is to rate every particular Neceſſary, juſt when it is ripe for Conſumption; that is to ſay, not to rate Corn until it be Bread, nor Wool until it be Cloth, or rather until it be a very Garment; ſo as the value of Wool, Cloathing, and Tayloring, even to the Thread and Needles might be comprehended: But this being perhaps too laborious to be performed, we ought to enumerate a Catalogue of Commodities both native and artificial, ſuch whereof accompts may be moſt eaſily taken, and can bear the Office marks either on themſelves, or on what contains them; being withall ſuch, as are to be as near Conſumption as poſſible: And then we are to compute what further labour or charge is to be beſtowed on each of them, before conſumption, that ſo an allowance be given accordingly. As for example, ſuppoſe there be an hundred pounds worth of Stript Stuff for Hangings, and an hundred pounds worth of Cloth or Stuff for the beſt mens Cloathes; I conceive, that the Cloth ſhould bear a greater Excize then the ſaid ſtript ſtuff, the one wanting nothing but tacking up, to be at its wayes end; and the other Tayloring, Thread, Silk, Needles, Thimbles, Buttons, and ſeveral other particulars: The Exciſe of all which muſt be accumulated upon the Excize of the Cloth, unleſs they be ſo great (as perhaps Buttons, Lace, or Ribbons may be) to be taxed apart, and inſerted into the Catalogue abovementioned.

4. Now the things to be accumulated upon Cloth are, as near as poſſible, to be ſuch particulars as are uſed onely to Cloth, or very rarely to any other particular, as the ſeveral ſorts of peculiar trimmings; ſo, on Corn ſhould be accumulated the charge of grinding, boking, yeaſt, &c. for the baking of it into Bread, unleſs, as was ſaid before, any of theſe particulars can be better rated apart.

5. A Queſtion ariſeth hence, whether any Native Commodities exported ought to pay the Excize, or that what is imported

ported in lieu of it ſhould pay none? I anſwer no, becauſe they are not ſpent here *in ſpecie*; but I conceive that the Goods returned from abroad for them and ſpent here ſhould pay, if the exported have not already, for ſo ſhall what we ſpend pay once, but not oftner. Now if Bullion be returned, then if it be coyned into Money it ought not to pay, becauſe Money will beget other commodities which ſhall pay; but if the ſaid Bullion be wrought into Plate and Utenſils, or diſgroſſ into Wire or Lace, or beaten into Fueilles, then it alſo ought to pay becauſe it is conſumed and abſolutely ſpent, as in Lace and Gilding is too notorious; and this is the reaſon why I think the Leavy we commonly call Cuſtoms to be unſeaſonable and prepoſterous, the ſame being a payment before conſumption.

6. We have ſeveral times ſpoken of Accumulative Excize, by which we mean Taxing many things together as one. As for example, ſuppoſe the many Drugs uſed in Treacle or Mithridate were uſed onely in thoſe Compoſitions, in ſuch caſe by taxing any one of them, the whole number will be taxed as certainly as that one, becauſe they all bear a certain proportion one to another: In Cloth, the Workmanſhip and Tools as well as the Wool may be well enough taxed, &c.

7. But ſome have ſtrained this Accumulation ſo, as they would have all things together taxed upon ſome one ſingle particular, ſuch as they think to be neareſt the Common ſtandard of all Expence, the principal ends of their propoſition being theſe, *viz.*

Firſt, To diſguiſe the name of Excize, as odious to them that do neither know the payment of Taxes to be as indiſpenſable as eating, and as have not conſidered the natural juſtice of this way of Excizing or proportionating.

Secondly, To avoid the trouble and charge of Collecting.

Thirdly, To bring the buſineſs *ad firmam*, and to a certainty of all which we ſhall ſpeak hereafter, when we examine the ſeveral reaſons for and againſt the way of Excize, proceeding now to the ſeveral *ſpecies* of Accumulative Excizes, propounded in the world.

8. Some propound Beer to be the only Excizable Commodi-

ty,

ty, ſuposing that in the proportion that men drink, they make all other Expences; which certainly will not hold, eſpecially if Strong Beer pay quintuple unto (as now) or any more Excize then the ſmall: for poor Carpenters, Smiths, Feltmakers, &c. drinking twice as much Strong Beer as Gentlemen do of ſmall, muſt conſequently pay ten times as much Excize. Moreover, upon the Artizans Beer is accumulated, onely a little Bread and Cheeſe, leathern Clothes, Neck-Beef, and Inwards twice a week, ſtale Fiſh, old Peaſe without Butter, &c. Whereas on the other, beſide Drink, is accumulated as many more things as Nature and Art can produce; beſides this way of Excizing, though it be never ſo well adminiſtred, is neither ſo equal nor ſo eaſie, nor ſo examinable as the ſimple Poll-money before ſpoken of, which is alſo but an Accumulative Excize.

9. What hath been propounded for Beer may be of Salt, Fuel, Bread, &c. and the Propoſitions would all labour under the ſame Inconveniences; for ſome ſpend more ſome leſs of theſe Commodities; and ſometimes Families (each whereof are propounded to be farmed, without deſcending to individual heads) are more numerous at ſome times then at others, according as their Eſtates or other Intereſts ſhall wax or wane.

10. Of all the Accumulative Excizes, that of Harth-money or Smoak-money ſeems the beſt; and that onely becauſe the eaſieſt, and cleareſt, and fitteſt to ground a certain Revenue upon; it being eaſie to tell the number of Harths, which remove not as heads or Polls do: Moreover, 'tis more eaſie to pay a ſmall Tax, then to alter or abrogate Harths, even though they are uſeleſs and ſupernumerary; nor is it poſſible to cover them, becauſe moſt of the neighbours know them; nor in new Building will any man who gives forty ſhillings for making a Chimney be without it for two.

11. Here is to be noted, that a Harth-money muſt be but ſmall, or elſe 'twill be intollerable; it being more eaſie for a Gentleman of a thouſand pound *per annum* to pay for an hundred Chimneys (few of their Manſion Houſes having more) then for Labourers to pay for two. Moreover if the Land-Lord onely pay this Tax, then is it not an Accumulative Excize

cize for all, but a particular Excize upon but one onely Commodity, namely Housing.

12 Now the Reasons for Excize are these, *viz.*

First, The Natural Justice that every man should pay according to what he actually enjoyeth; upon which account this Tax is scarce forced upon any, and is very light to those, who please to be content with natural Necessaries.

Secondly, This Tax if it be not farmed, but regularly collected, engages to thrift, the onely way to enrich a Nation, as by the Dutch and Jews, and by all other men, who have come to vaste Estates by Trade, doth appear.

Thirdly, No man payes double or twice for the same thing, forasmuch as nothing can be spent but once; whereas it is frequently seen, that otherwise men pay both by the Rent of their Lands, by their Smoaks, by their Titles, and by Customs, (which all men do, though Marchants chiefly talk of it) they also pay by Benevolence and by Tythes; whereas in this way of Excize no man need pay but one way, nor but once, properly speaking.

Fifthly, By this way an excellent account may be taken of the Wealth, Growth, Trade, and strength of the Nation at all times. All which Reasons do make not for particular compoundings with Families, nor for letting the whole to farm, but for collecting it by special Officers, who having a full employment, will not be a fourth of the charge of our present many multiform Levies; for to put extraordinary trouble and hazzard upon the Countrey Officers, is a sorer Taxing of them, then to make them pay a small Reward unto practised Persons to be their Substitutes. All which are the common Objections against Excize.

13. I should here adde the manner of Collecting it, but I refer this to the practice of *Holland*; and I might also offer how men may be framed to be fit for this and other Publick Trusts, as to be Cashiers, Store-keepers, Collectors, &c. but I refer this Enquiry unto a more ample and fit occasion.

FINIS.